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Abstract 
 
This Paper explores the role of copyright’s fair use doctrine as 
a limit on the moral right of integrity.  The moral right of integrity 
gives an author the right to prevent any distortion, modification, or 
mutilation of their work that prejudices their honor or reputation.  
Actions that have been found to violate an author’s moral right of 
integrity include, for instance, altering a mural by painting clothing 
over nude figures, selling separated panels of a single work of art, 
and displaying sculptures with holiday ribbons.  At the same time, 
copyright’s fair use doctrine allows follow-on creators to transform 
original works by altering the original work with new expression, 
meaning, or message.  While the federal Visual Artists Rights Act of 
1990 (VARA) includes language explicitly making the right of integ-
rity “[s]ubject to” copyright’s fair use doctrine under § 107, there 
have been no decisions in the United States interpreting how the 
doctrine might apply to a moral right of integrity claim.  The lack of 
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case law interpreting how courts might balance an author’s moral 
right of integrity with the public’s rights to expression is particularly 
troubling in light of the ongoing discussion to expand moral rights 
in the United States.  If moral rights are to be expanded, most inter-
est- or industry-groups and commentators agree that those rights 
must be subject to fair use.  However, without any guidance from 
courts, and with commentators and legislative history doubting the 
compatibility of fair use with the right of integrity, how can the 
United States expand moral rights with the assumption that fair use 
would provide the proper balance between authors’ rights and the 
public’s rights?  This Paper illustrates different contexts in visual 
art where a follow-on creator distorts, mutilates, or modifies an au-
thor’s work in order to make an artistic, social, or political state-
ment, and how the doctrine of fair use might limit the moral right of 
integrity in those contexts.  It argues that copyright’s fair use doc-
trine can serve as a limitation on an author’s moral right of integrity 
and illustrates how the four fair use factors in § 107 may be used to 
balance the author’s right of integrity with the public’s rights to find 
fair use where a follow-on creator modifies, distorts, or mutilates an 
author’s work to transform the work and give the work new mean-
ing. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The standoff appeared overnight.1  A sculpture of a slight girl facing the 
famed Wall Street Charging Bull sculpture.2  Her hands on her hips, her po-
nytail flowing in the breeze, her eyes staring fearlessly at the Charging Bull.3  
The girl’s face is slightly upturned in defiance or pride or, more practically, 
to fully face the Charging Bull, which is a few feet taller than the girl.4  The 
Fearless Girl, as she was called, immediately became a cause célèbre.5  Many 
embraced her and the message she displayed: of gender equality and “the 
power of women in leadership.”6  Others criticized her as being a publicity 
stunt for the financial firm that commissioned her creation and one that rein-
forced “corporate feminism” instead of true gender equality.7  One person who 
objected to the standoff between Fearless Girl and Charging Bull was the 
artist who created the Charging Bull sculpture almost thirty years ago, Arturo 
Di Modica.8  Through his attorney, Di Modica claimed that Fearless Girl vi-
olated his intellectual property rights, including his moral right of integrity in 
Charging Bull.9  He claimed that Fearless Girl changed the positive message 
of Charging Bull from one of optimism and showing “the strength and power 
of the American people”10 after the 1987 stock market crash, to a negative 
message connoting antifeminism and suppression of gender equality.11  But 
 
 1. See Sandra E. Garcia, ‘Fearless Girl’ Statute Finds a New Home: At the New York Stock Ex-
change, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/10/nyregion/fearless-girl-
statue-stock-exchange-.html. 
 2. See Cara Marsh Sheffler, The ‘Fearless Girl’ Statue Sums Up What’s Wrong with Feminism 
Today, GUARDIAN (Mar. 14, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/mar/14/fear-
less-girl-statue-whats-wrong-feminism-today. 
 3. See Garcia, supra note 1. 
 4. See Sarah Cascone, From ‘Charging Bull’ to the Bull Market: ‘Fearless Girl’ Heads to the 
New York Stock Exchange, ARTNET NEWS (Apr. 19, 2018), https://news.artnet.com/art-world/fearless-
girl-new-york-stock-exchange-1269851. 
 5. See Garcia, supra note 1. 
 6. See Garcia, supra note 1. 
 7. Sheffler, supra note 2. 
 8. ‘Charging Bull’ Sculptor Says New York’s ‘Fearless Girl’ Statue Violates His Rights, 
GUARDIAN (Apr. 11, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/apr/12/charging-bull-new-
york-fearless-girl-statue-copyright-claim. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Harrison Jacobs, Millions of People from all over the World have Visited this New York Statue 
– Here’s Why, BUSINESS INSIDER (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.businessinsider.com/what-is-wall-
street-charging-bull-new-york-city-2017-12. 
 11. James Barron, Wounded by ‘Fearless Girl,’ Creator of ‘Charging Bull’ Wants Her to Move, 
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what rights does an artist have to preserve the message in his art?  This Paper 
examines the role of copyright’s fair use doctrine12 as a limit on an author’s 
moral right of integrity.13 
The moral right of integrity gives an author the right to prevent or object 
to any distortion, mutilation, modification, or derogatory action to an author’s 
work that would prejudice the author’s honor or reputation.14  Authors retain 
their moral rights in their works even if they no longer retain the physical copy 
of the work or the copyright to the work.15  Actions that violate an author’s 
moral right of integrity outside of the United States include, for instance, using 
a film character for promotional purposes “contrary to the spirit of the 
[film],”16 “present[ing] a fictional work as a biographical work,”17 altering a 
mural by painting clothing on nude figures,18 separately selling panels of a 
single work of art,19 and tying and displaying holiday ribbons on sculptures.20  
In the United States, the only federal law that explicitly grants authors the 
moral right of integrity is the federal Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 
(VARA), which gives authors the right “to prevent the intentional distortion, 
mutilation, or other modification” of their single-copy or limited-edition 
 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/12/nyregion/charging-bull-sculpture-
wall-street-fearless-girl.html?_r=0. 
 12. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
 13. See id. § 106A(a)(3)(A). 
 14. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 6bis(1), Sept. 9, 1886, 
123 L.N.T.S. 233, revised at Paris July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Berne 
Convention] (entered into force in U.S. Mar. 1, 1989). 
 15. Edward J. Damich, The Right of Personality: A Common-law Basis for the Protection of the 
Moral Rights of Authors, 23 GA. L. REV. 1, 4 (1988) (distinguishing moral rights from other property 
protections on the basis “that works of art are expressions of the creative personality of the author, and 
insofar as these works continue to embody the author’s personality, acts done to them that impair his 
or her ability accurately to reflect the authors personality should be actionable”). 
 16. Maree Sainsbury, Parody, Satire, Honour and Reputation: The Interplay Between Economic 
and Moral Rights, 18 AIPJ 149, 159 (2007) (discussing Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal], 
Paris, com., Sept. 8, 2004, No. 04/09673, where director and producer of The Fifth Element success-
fully sued an advertising company for using a character from the film in an advertisement for Voda-
fone Live). 
 17. Id. (citing Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal], Paris, com., May 29, 2002). 
 18. John Henry Merryman, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1023, 1038 n.56 
(1976) (discussing Reichsgericht [RG] [court of last resort for civil and criminal matters] June 8, 1912, 
79 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES REICHSGERICHTS IN ZIVILSACHEN [RGZ] 397 (Ger.)). 
 19. Id. at 1023 (citing Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal], Paris, May 30. D. Jur 1962 
570). 
 20. Snow v. The Eaton Centre Ltd. (1982), 70 C.P.R. (2d) 105 (Can. Ont. H.C.J.). 
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works of visual art21 that would prejudice their “honor or reputation.”22  Un-
like most other nations’ moral rights legislation, VARA explicitly includes 
language making the right of integrity “[s]ubject to” copyright law’s § 107 
fair use provision.23  However, no court in the United States has decided a fair 
use defense to a moral rights claim, and a number of commentators have ex-
pressed doubt about the compatibility of fair use with moral rights.24 
This Paper argues that the moral right of integrity should be limited by 
fair use.  Specifically, this Paper examines different contexts where follow-on 
creators distort, mutilate, or modify an author’s work to give the work new 
meaning or to express a political, social, or artistic message.  Where the social 
benefit of these transformative secondary uses and the free expression of fol-
low-on creators outweigh the harm to the author’s honor or reputation, fair 
use should excuse the follow-on creators from liability arising under the moral 
right of integrity.25  In the United States, these contexts may extend to in-
stances where a follow-on creator uses an author’s limited-edition work of 
visual art.26  In limited instances, fair use may even extend to the distortion, 
mutilation, or modification of an author’s original work of visual art.27 
The purpose of this Paper is not to recommend a new defense to moral 
rights.28  As noted above, the text of VARA already explicitly recognizes a 
fair use defense.29  This Paper is also not setting out to fix fair use or to advo-
 
 21. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“A ‘work of visual art’ is a . . . a painting, 
drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy [or] in a limited edition of 200 copies or 
fewer . . . .”). 
 22. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A) (2012). 
 23. Id. § 106A(a). 
 24. See infra Section II.B. 
 25. See infra Part V; see also Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Bill 
Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 612–13 (2d Cir. 2006)) (finding that the 
second factor, “nature of the copyrighted work,” of the four-factor fair use determination applied with 
less force where one artist uses another artist’s work in a transformative manner to comment on her 
image’s social and aesthetic meaning rather than to exploit its creative virtues). 
 26. See Geri J. Yonover, The Precarious Balance: Moral Rights, Parody, and Fair Use, 14 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 79, 83–85, 122–23 (1996) (arguing that an artist’s work mutilating a 
hypothetical limited-edition Mona Lisa by adding a mustache to it could be protected by fair use as a 
parody). 
 27. See, e.g., Amy M. Adler, Against Moral Rights, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 263, 281–82 (2009) (dis-
cussing an art critic who found that the mutilation of an original work had “become essential to the 
work”). 
 28. See infra Part II. 
 29. See Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012). 
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cate for an expansion of moral rights, nor is it meant to critique courts’ appli-
cations or misapplications of the fair use factors under § 107 in copyright in-
fringement claims.30  Instead, this Paper contemplates how the defense of fair 
use—as it is currently interpreted and applied in copyright infringement 
claims—should limit an author’s moral right of integrity claim without having 
to restrict the scope of fair use to give the moral right of integrity meaning.31  
While the analysis in this Paper will help clarify application of fair use to 
integrity claims and, hopefully, encourage litigants and courts to look more 
closely at fair use as a plausible defense in moral rights litigation, its purpose 
extends further.32  The analysis in this Paper will also help inform ongoing 
discussions on the expansion of moral rights in the United States and that ex-
pansion’s potential implications on free expression.33  As explained below, 
the U.S. Copyright Office recently undertook a study to explore the possible 
expansion of moral rights, and the creative industry raised First Amendment 
concerns in response to possible expansion of moral rights in the United 
States.34  Indeed, if the United States were to expand the coverage of moral 
rights to include literary texts, musical works, or other mass-produced items 
like other civil- and common-law countries currently do, understanding fair 
use and how it balances authors’ rights of integrity with follow-on creators’ 
and the public’s rights to expression is important to ensure that expression is 
not chilled. 
Part II of this Paper offers a brief introduction to the moral right of integ-
rity, its applications in visual arts cases in the United States under VARA, and 
the ongoing pressure to expand its scope and subject matter in the United 
States.35  Part III discusses fair use and addresses arguments that fair use is 
incompatible with the moral right of integrity.36  Part IV analyzes different 
instances that could violate the moral right of integrity, and how fair use would 
apply in each context.37  To help illustrate the flexibility of fair use, these con-
texts include, for instance, where a defendant distorts, mutilates, or modifies 
 
 30. See infra Parts III–IV. 
 31. See infra Part IV. 
 32. See infra Parts IV–V. 
 33. See infra Section II.B. 
 34. See infra Section II.B; Study on the Moral Rights of Attribution and Integrity, 82 Fed. Reg. 
7870 (Jan. 23, 2017) [hereinafter Moral Rights Study]. 
 35. See infra Part II. 
 36. See infra Part III. 
 37. See infra Part IV. 
[Vol. 47: 601, 2020] Creative Destruction 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
608 
the meaning of an author’s work without physically altering the work;38 where 
a defendant distorts, mutilates, or modifies an author’s work by physically—
but temporarily or impermanently—altering the work;39 and where a defend-
ant permanently distorts, mutilates, or modifies the physical copy of an au-
thor’s work in order to make an artistic, social, or political statement.40  This 
Paper concludes that recognizing a fair use limitation to right of integrity 
claims is important to ensure free expression is not stifled under the pretext of 
protecting an author’s honor or reputation.41 
II. THE MORAL RIGHT OF INTEGRITY 
Moral rights protect an author’s personality, honor, and soul in their 
work.42  Moral rights are often described as non-economic rights, which are 
independent from the copyright or property right in a work; in other words, an 
author retains their moral rights to their work even after transferring the work 
or copyright in the work to another person.43  Moral rights originated in nine-
teenth-century Europe, but have since been adopted by many civil- and com-
mon-law countries to protect authors’ rights of integrity and attribution to their 
expressive works.44  Moral rights legislation typically protects the moral rights 
 
 38. See infra Section IV.A. 
 39. See infra Section IV.B. 
 40. See infra Section IV.C. 
 41. See infra Part V. 
 42. See Sonya G. Bonneau, Honor and Destruction: The Conflicted Object in Moral Rights Law, 
87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 47, 49 (2013). 
 43. See id. at 52 (describing moral rights theory and stating, “moral rights are non-economic, inal-
ienable rights that transcend the economic formalities of sale”); Berne Convention, supra note 14, 25 
U.S.T. 1341, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 (“Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even after the 
transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object 
to any distortion, mutilation[,] or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the 
said work, which would be prejudicial to his honour or reputation.”). 
 44. See, e.g., Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, c. 4, §§ 80(1), 80(2)(b) (Eng.) (“The author 
of a copyright literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work, and the director of a copyright film, has the 
right . . . not to have his work subjected to derogatory treatment. . . .  [T]he treatment of a work is 
derogatory if it amounts to distortion or mutilation of the work or is otherwise prejudicial to the honour 
or reputation of the author or director . . . .”); Copyright Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-42, ss. 14.1(1), 28.2 
(Can.) (“The author of a work has . . . the right to the integrity of the work . . . . “The author’s . . . right 
to the integrity of a work . . . is infringed only if the work . . . is, to the prejudice of its author’s . . . hon-
our or reputation, (a) distorted, mutilated or otherwise modified . . . .”); Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) pt 
IX div 4 s 195AI–AK (Austl.) (“The author of a work has a right of integrity of authorship in respect 
of the work.  The author’s right is the right not to have the work subjected to derogatory treat-
ment. . . .  [D]erogatory treatment . . . means: (a) the doing, in relation to the work, of anything that 
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of authors of literary, dramatic, artistic, musical, and audio-visual works.45  
These moral rights generally grant authors control over their works by giving 
them the right of attribution, the right of disclosure and withdrawal, and the 
right of integrity.46  The right of attribution grants authors the right to claim 
authorship of their work and the right to publish their work anonymously or 
pseudonymously.47  The right of disclosure and withdrawal grants authors the 
sole discretion to decide when their work is released to the public and whether 
to remove their work from the public.48  Finally, the right of integrity gives an 
author the right to prevent the alteration, distortion, or mutilation of their 
work, even after the author transfers or sells the work or copyright to the 
work.49  This Paper focuses on the moral right of integrity. 
The moral right of integrity is concerned with preserving the dignity and 
personhood of the author.50  Commentators tend to justify the moral right of 
integrity by presenting work as an expression of an author’s personality or an 
“expression of his innermost being,”51 because “an artist in the process of cre-
ation injects his spirit into the work.”52  Therefore, when another person dis-
torts, mutilates, or misrepresents the work, they “mistreat[] an expression of 
the artist’s personality, affects his artistic identity, personality, and honor.”53  
As Henry Hansmann and Marina Santilli explained, the physical alteration of 
an artist’s work, or the prejudicial display of their work, can cause “personal 
anguish [to] the artist,” because “an artist may identify with his works as with 
 
results in a material distortion of, the mutilation of, or a material alteration to, the work that is preju-
dicial to the author’s honour or reputation . . . .  [I]n relation to an artistic work, [derogatory treatment] 
means . . . an exhibition in public of the work that is prejudicial to the author’s honour or reputation 
because of the manner or place in which the exhibition occurs . . . .”). 
 45. See supra note 44. 
 46. Cyrill P. Rigamonti, Deconstructing Moral Rights, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 353, 356 (2006).  
Some countries further recognize an author’s moral right to have access to the original work, to compel 
the completion of a work, and to prevent their work from being associated with undesirable products 
or institutions.  See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, AUTHORS, ATTRIBUTION, AND INTEGRITY: EXAMINING 
MORAL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 14 (2019).  These are much more limited and are sometimes 
considered an “extension” of moral rights.  Id. at 14 n. 51. 
 47. Rigamonti, supra note 46, at 364. 
 48. Id. at 362. 
 49. See id. at 364. 
 50. See Yonover, supra note 26, at 112. 
 51. JOHN MERRYMAN ET AL., LAW, ETHICS, AND THE VISUAL ARTS 423 (5th ed. 2007) [hereinafter 
MERRYMAN ET AL.]. 
 52. Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 53. Merryman, supra note 18, at 1027. 
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his children: prize them for their present character and not want that character 
changed.  Or he may be trying to communicate something to others, whether 
they want to receive the message or not.”54  Roberta Kwall explains that the 
right of integrity functions “to safeguard the author’s meaning and message, 
and thus [is] designed to increase an author’s ability to safeguard the integrity 
of her texts.”55  Some commentators believe that “mistreat[ing] the work of 
art is to mistreat the artist”; they view the moral right of integrity as a right of 
personhood for the artist.56  Others see moral rights as a way to preserve sig-
nificant works for the public, finding “the moral right of the artist . . . [as] a 
method of providing for private enforcement of this public interest.”57  More 
view moral rights as an anti-defamation law to protect artists’ reputation and 
honor; as Joseph Sax explained, “‘One of the primary misconceptions regard-
ing the French concept of droit moral is the assumption that it seeks to protect 
the public interest by preserving artworks for posterity.’  It does not.”58 
There are various ways in which an author’s right to integrity may be 
violated.  For instance, the French artist Bernard Buffett painted a composition 
on a refrigerator, covering all six panels of the refrigerator with art, including 
the front, top, and sides of the refrigerator.59  The art consisted of a plate of 
food, a fish, a pedestal tray, and a vase with foliage in Buffet’s signature ex-
pressionist style.60  A Paris gallery exhibited Buffet’s refrigerator and other 
refrigerators decorated by famous artists in its Nobility of Every Day Objects 
exhibition in 1958.61  The artist considered the six panels to be one single work 
 
 54. Henry Hansmann & Marina Santilli, Authors’ and Artists’ Moral Rights: A Comparative Legal 
and Economic Analysis, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 95, 102 (1997). 
 55. ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A MORAL RIGHTS LAW 
FOR THE UNITED STATES 6 (1999). 
 56. MERRYMAN ET AL., supra note 51, at 423. 
 57. Merryman, supra note 18, at 1041. 
 58. SAX, PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHTS IN CULTURAL 
TREASURES 22 (1999); see also Cathay Y. N. Smith, Community Rights to Public Art, 90 ST. JOHN’S 
L. REV. 369, 407 (2016) (“Moral rights—or droit moral—protect an artist’s personality, integrity, and 
reputation in her art.  Moral rights are rights that belong to the artist, so they do not protect the public’s 
interest in the art.”). 
 59. Merryman, supra note 18, at 1023. 
 60. John Henry Merryman, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 12 STAN. L. 5, 5 (1977), 
https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Stanford_Lawyer_issue-19_1977-
SPRING-VOL12-NO1_front.pdf (picturing and describing a painting of a refrigerator by Bernard Buf-
fet). 
 61. Paris 'Frige' is Worth a Fortune, ALAMY, https://www.alamy.com/jun-26-1958-paris-frige-is-
worth-a-fortune-a-paris-gallery-is-now-image69352322.html (showing image of Bernard Buffet’s re-
frigerator at a Paris gallery in “Nobility of Every Day Objects” in 1958). 
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of art and signed only one of the panels before auctioning the refrigerator at a 
charity auction.62  Six months after the auction, one of the painted panels ap-
peared in the auction catalogue for another sale.63  The separated panel, which 
was listed for sale independently from the rest of the work, was titled Still Life 
with Fruits by Bernard Buffet and described as “a painting on metal.”64  After 
discovering the impending sale of the work, Buffet brought a right of integrity 
action against the owner of the refrigerator to prevent him from separately 
selling the single panel.65  Buffet argued that to separate one panel of the work, 
and to treat it as a separate and independent work, distorted and misrepre-
sented his artistic intention and violated his right to integrity in his work.66  
The French court agreed.67  The court allowed the owner of the refrigerator to 
keep and enjoy the work or transfer the entire composition, but the court en-
joined the owner from separating the work and disposing of it piece-by-
piece.68 
In Germany, the owner of a house commissioned an artist to create a mu-
ral on his wall.69  The mural included nude figures.70  The owner of the house 
was offended by the nudity and hired another artist to paint clothing onto the 
nudes.71  The original artist complained that this violated his moral right of 
integrity in his art and sued the owner.72  The German court agreed with the 
artist.73  Another case in Germany involved a defendant who added custom-
ized frames to artworks, which extended the patterns of the artworks onto the 
frames.74  The court in that case held that this violated the artist’s right of 
integrity.75  In Sweden, the Stockholm District Court found an artist’s moral 
 
 62. Merryman, supra note 18, at 1023. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 1027. 
 67. Id. at 1023. 
 68. Id. at 1023 n.1, 1027. 
 69. Id. at 1038 n.56 (discussing Reichsgericht [RG] [court of las resort for civil and criminal mat-
ters] June 8, 1912, 79 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES REICHSGERICHTS IN ZIVILSACHEN [RGZ] 397 (Ger.)). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Rigamonti, supra note 46, at 365–66 (discussing Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of 
Justice], 150 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 32 (F.R.G.). 
 75. Id. at 366. 
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right of integrity to be violated when his work was exhibited next to highly 
pornographic photographs.76  This placement, the court found, modified the 
context of the author’s work and “prejudiced the author’s reputation or indi-
viduality.”77  In France, a court held that a defendant’s unauthorized use of 
Jean Lurçat’s, a French tapestry artist, works for advertising violated his moral 
right of integrity.78 
In Belgium, Johan Deckmyn, from the Flemish nationalist political party 
Vlaams Belang, created copies of a calendar to hand out to party supporters.79  
The cover of the calendar was based on the cover of the Spike and Suzy comic 
“De Wilde Weldoener,” but with a xenophobic message.80  Specifically, 
Deckmyn replaced the main character with an image of the mayor of Ghent 
throwing money into a crowd and replaced the crowd in the background with 
characters wearing headscarves collecting the money.81  The heirs of Willy 
Vandersteen, the author of Spike and Suzy, sued Deckmyn for copyright in-
fringement and violation of the moral right of integrity.82  The Civil Court of 
the Court of First Instance in Brussels enjoined Deckmyn from distributing 
the infringing calendars.83 
In Canada, the artist of Flight Stop—a hanging sculpture consisting of 
sixty flying geese—sued the owner of the work for displaying the work with 
 
 76.  Jonas Brown-Pedersen, The Inadequacy of UK Moral Rights Protection: A Comparative Study 
on the Waivability of Rights and Recontexualisation of Works in Copyright and Droit D’auteurs Sys-
tems, 3 LSE L. REV. 115, 127 (2018). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Rigamonti, supra note 46, at 366; Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 4e ch., 
June 6, 1978, 99. RIDA 1979, 165 (Fr.). 
 79. Magdalena Jozwiak, No Laughing Matter: The Right to Parody in EU Copyright Law (Case 
Deckmyn v. Vandersteen, C-201/13,) EUROPEAN L. BLOG (Sept. 25, 2014), http://europeanlaw-
blog.eu/2014/09/25/no-laughing-matter-the-right-to-parody-in-eu-copyright-law-case-deckmyn-v-
vandersteen-c-20113/. 
 80. Id. 
 81.  Id.; Alain Strowel, ‘Parody’ Becomes a Concept of EU Law: Something to Applaud or to 
Fear?, IPDIGIT (Nov. 2, 2014), http://www.ipdigit.eu/2014/11/parody-becomes-a-concept-of-eu-law-
something-to-applaud-or-to-fear/. 
 82. Jozwiak, supra note 79. 
 83. Id.  The Court of Appeal in Brussels referred questions of interpreting the defense of parody 
to the European Court of Justice.  Id.  In September 2014, the European Court of Justice did not ex-
plicitly address whether the facts of this case would fall under a parody defense, but did caution that 
the application of the parody defense “must strike a fair balance between, on the one hand, the interests 
and rights of [authors and artists] . . . and, on the other, the freedom of expression of the user of a 
protected work who is relying on the exception for parody.”  C-201/13, Deckmyn v. Vander-
steen, 2014, E.C.J. 27, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document_print.jsf?doclang=EN&text 
=&pageIndex=0&part=1&mode=lst&docid=157281&occ=first&dir=&cid=198445. 
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red holiday ribbons around the geese’s necks.84  The artist, Michael Snow, felt 
that the addition of the ribbons “jarred the harmony of his naturalistic compo-
sition, altered its basic character and purpose, and ultimately affected his ar-
tistic reputation.”85  In addition to the artist’s own statement that the ribbons 
prejudiced his honor and reputation, experts testified that the red ribbons on 
Snow’s sculpture made “a mockery of its intended purpose” and transformed 
the work “into a ‘kitschy’ sentimental display, resembling a Christmas bau-
ble.”86  Snow sued Eaton Centre, and the Canadian court ordered the Centre 
to remove the red ribbons.87 
These cases represent the potential strength of the moral right of integrity 
to authors and visual artists, allowing authors and artists to preserve the mean-
ing and message in their works.88  In its most expansive form, the moral right 
of integrity allows an author, or their heirs, to not only reject actual physical 
modifications of the author’s work, but also contextual modifications of the 
author’s work that places the work into a context different from what the au-
thor intended—even if the modification leaves the work physically untouched 
and intact.89  In the United States, however, authors’ moral rights of integrity 
are limited to those granted under VARA.90 
  
 
 84. Sophie Eastwood, Snow v. The Eaton Centre Ltd. (1982) 70 C.P.R. (2d) 105, UNIV. 
CAMBRIDGE: CTR. FOR INTELL. PROP. & INFO. L. (July 2015), https://www.cipil.law.cam.ac.uk/vir-
tual-museum/snow-v-eaton-centre-ltd-1982-70-cpr-2d-105. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id.; Snow v. The Eaton Centre Ltd. (1982) 70 C.P.R. (2d) 105 (Can. Ont. H.C.J.). 
 88. See supra notes 59–87 and accompanying text. 
 89. Rigamonti, supra note 46, at 365 (“[T]he general rule is that any and all substantive modifica-
tions are prohibited.  This prohibition . . . applies to contextual modifications that leave the substance 
of the work intact, but that change the appearance or perception of the work by putting it into a context 
that differs from the one originally intended or envisioned by the author.”). 
 90. See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text.  Certain states, including California and New 
York, have legislated state moral rights.  See California Art Preservation Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 987 
(West 2012); Artists’ Authorship Rights Act, N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. § 14.03 (McKinney 2012).  For 
instance, the California Art Preservation Act prevents the public display of works of fine art that have 
been physically defaced, mutilated, altered, or destroyed.  See 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.07; CIV. 
CODE § 987.  New York’s Artists’ Authorship Rights Act prohibits the unauthorized public display, 
publication or reproduction of a work of fine art “in an altered, defaced, mutilated or modified form.”  
See 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.08.  This Article will not address state law rights. 
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A. The Moral Right of Integrity Under VARA 
In the United States, VARA is the only federal law explicitly protecting 
the moral rights of authors.91  Authors’ rights under VARA are narrower than 
its counterparts in other common- or civil-law jurisdictions such as Europe, 
Australia, and Canada.92  For one, VARA only grants to authors the right of 
attribution, the right of integrity, and the right to prevent the destruction of 
works of recognized stature.93  VARA only protects the moral rights of authors 
that create one type of work: works of visual art.94  This excludes other works 
of authorship, such as literary, dramatic, musical, and audio-visual works.95  
VARA also limits its protection to single copies or limited-edition copies of 
visual art works; specifically, it defines “work[s] of visual art” as paintings, 
drawings, prints, sculptures, or still photographic images produced for exhi-
bition purposes, “existing in a single copy, in a limited edition of 200 copies 
 
 91. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 46, at 59–60.  Other federal laws that could protect 
moral rights of authors include § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, which had been asserted against defendants 
who failed to “properly credit an author or edit[ed] an author’s work without permission ‘into a form 
that departs substantially from the original work.’”  Id. at 40 (footnote omitted).  These potential claims 
under § 43(a) were significantly narrowed, but not completely foreclosed, by the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003).  See 
generally U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 46, at 40–58.  Section 1202 of the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act also provides some moral rights protection by prohibiting the removal, alteration, or 
falsification of certain copyright management information, such as the author.  17 U.S.C. § 1202 
(2012).  Finally, copyright’s derivative works rights also grant authors the right to prevent the unau-
thorized modification of their copyrighted works.  Id. § 106(2). 
 92. See infra notes 235–38; see also U.S. COPYRIGHTS OFFICE, supra note 46, at 11–12. 
 93. 17 U.S.C. § 106A.  Courts sometimes consider the right to prevent the destruction of works of 
recognized stature as a standalone right separate from the right of integrity.  See Carter v. Helmsley 
Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 1995) (“In some jurisdictions the integrity right also protects art-
work from destruction.”(emphasis added))  Others consider it an add-on right to the right of integrity.  
See id.  This Paper separates the right to prevent destruction of a work of recognized stature from the 
right of integrity.  See infra Part IV.  Destruction is not the same as distortion, mutilation, modification, 
because the total destruction of a work does not prejudice the honor or reputation of an artist.  See 
Carter, 71 F.3d at 81–82 (“[D]estruction is seen as less harmful than the continued display of deformed 
or mutilated work that misrepresents the artist and destruction may proceed.”).  Indeed, once the work 
is destroyed, it is no longer on public display in a way that may be contrary to the author’s intent, and 
the distortion, mutilation, or modification cannot be attributed to the author.  See supra note 54 and 
accompanying text (explaining that the physical alteration or prejudicial display of an artist’s work 
can cause them anguish).  While the destruction of a work may disadvantage the artist because their 
work no longer exists, it does not cause the artist to be viewed in a different or negative light.  See 
Carter, 71 F.3d at 81–82. 
 94. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a). 
 95. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 46, at 61–62. 
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or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered.”96 
Once an author’s work qualifies as a work of visual art under VARA’s 
moral right of integrity, that author has the right “to prevent any intentional 
distortion, mutilation, or other modification” of their work that would preju-
dice their “honor or reputation.”97  In other words, the moral right of integrity 
that VARA grants to authors is subject to certain exceptions.98  For one, au-
thors can affirmatively waive their moral right of integrity.99  Any modifica-
tions of the work due to “the passage of time or the inherent nature of the 
materials” or as a “result of conservation . . . of the work” are also an excep-
tion to an artist’s right of integrity.100  Finally, under what is commonly re-
ferred to as the public presentation exception, VARA excuses from a violation 
of the right of integrity any modification of the work that “is the result 
of . . . the public presentation, including lighting and placement, of the 
work.”101 
The most common cases to arise under VARA are violations of an artist’s 
right to prevent the “destruction of a work of recognized stature.”102  In those 
cases, authors have had varying degrees of success with their assertion that 
their moral rights were violated by the destruction of their work of recognized 
stature.103  For one, many works of visual art are excluded from VARA’s def-
inition of a work of visual art.104  For instance, works of applied art are ex-
cluded from VARA’s definition of visual art.105  Therefore, a school bus trans-
formed into a mobile replica of a sixteenth-century Spanish galleon was 
excluded from VARA’s protection because it was considered applied art and 
not a “work of visual art.”106  Works made for hire are also excluded from 
VARA’s protection, such as a large “walk-through sculpture” created and in-
stalled in the lobby of a mixed-use building by employees at the direction of 
 
 96. 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 97. Id. §  06A(a)(3)(A). 
 98. Id. 
 99. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3) (“[T]he author of a work of visual art . . . shall have the right to prevent 
any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work . . . .”); id. § 106A(e) (“The 
rights conferred by subsection (a) may . . . be waived . . . .”). 
 100. Id. § 106A(c)(1)–(2). 
 101. Id. § 106A(c)(2). 
 102. See id. § 106A(a)(3)(B). 
 103. See infra notes 104–09 and accompanying text. 
 104. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “work of visual art”). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Cheffins v. Stewart, 825 F.3d 588, 595 (9th Cir. 2016). 
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their employer.107  One court even excluded site-specific art from VARA’s 
protection.108  This meant that, because a group of sculptures and stoneworks 
were integrated into their surroundings, they were site-specific art that were 
not protected by VARA.109  On the other hand, some artists have successfully 
asserted a violation of their moral right to prevent the destruction of their 
works of recognized stature.110  For instance, just recently, the 5Pointz street 
artists succeeded in their VARA claim against a real estate developer who 
whitewashed and destroyed their art on the walls of the 5Pointz warehouse.111  
Similarly, an artist was successful in his VARA claim against the City of In-
dianapolis when the City destroyed the artist’s sculpture without providing 
the artist with prior notice.112 
There have been fewer published decisions under the right of integrity in 
the United States.  In Massachusetts Museum of Contemporary Art Founda-
tion, Inc. v. Büchel, the artist Christoph Büchel asserted a claim under VARA 
for violation of his right of integrity against the Massachusetts Museum of 
Contemporary Art (MASS MoCA) arising out of a failed partnership between 
the parties.113  The artist and MASS MoCA entered into an agreement to create 
and display Büchel’s sculptural work, Training Ground for Democracy.114  
MASS MoCA funded the art, it went over budget, and then Büchel refused to 
continue the work because of artistic differences between him and the mu-
seum.115  According to the artist, MASS MoCA continued to work on Büchel’s 
project without his approval.116  Then, instead of destroying the work, MASS 
MoCA covered it under a tarp and invited audiences to walk past the covered 
work to attend its Made at MASS MoCA exhibit.117  Büchel sued MASS 
 
 107. Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 80, 88 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 108. Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 459 F.3d 128, 143 (1st Cir. 2006) (rejecting the argu-
ment that removal of the sculptures and stoneworks are excepted under the public presentation and 
finding, instead, that site specific art is not covered under VARA). 
 109. Id. 
 110. See infra notes 111–12 and accompanying text.   
 111. Cohen v. G & M Realty L.P., 320 F. Supp. 3d 421, 427–28 (E.D.N.Y. 2018). 
 112. Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 4 F. Supp. 2d 808, 811 (S.D. Ind. 1998). 
 113. Mass. Museum of Contemporary Art Found., Inc. v. Büchel, 593 F.3d 38, 41–42 (1st Cir. 
2010). 
 114. Id. at 41. 
 115. Id. at 43–45. 
 116. Id. at 45. 
 117. Id. at 46. 
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MoCA for violating his right of integrity for continuing to work on his sculp-
tural work without his approval, for displaying his work in an incomplete 
state, and for displaying his sculptural work covered with a tarp.118  The court 
disagreed that displaying Buchel’s incomplete work and his work covered by 
a tarp violated his right of integrity, even though the court surmised that 
MASS MoCA’s intent was to criticize Büchel.119  The court, however, denied 
MASS MoCA’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of whether MASS 
MoCA violated Büchel’s right of integrity by modifying Training Ground 
over Büchel’s objections in a manner that harmed his honor or reputation.120 
Many right of integrity cases never get decided on their merits when they 
are dismissed on the ground that the author’s work does not meet VARA’s 
narrow definition of a work of visual art.121  In Lilley v. Stout, for instance, 
photographer Gary Lilley asserted a claim under VARA for violation of his 
right of integrity against Renee Stout for Stout’s use of Lilley’s photos in her 
art.122  Lilley took several photos of a red room for Stout to use “as studies for 
paintings [Stout] planned to create.”123  Stout used six of Lilley’s photographs 
to create her work titled Red Room at Five.124  The work consisted of the six 
photographs “selected and arranged by [Stout] and placed in a binder with a 
red cover and illustration.”125  After the personal relationship between Lilley 
and Stout soured, Lilley sued Stout for violating his moral rights of integrity 
and attribution.126  Without ruling on whether Stout’s use of Lilley’s photo-
graphs in Stout’s art violated Lilley’s moral rights in his photos, the court 
found that the photographs were not covered under VARA.127  Specifically, 
because Lilley’s photographs were not produced for exhibition purposes, they 
did not qualify under VARA’s definition of a work of visual art.128 
Similarly, in Kelley v. Chicago Park District, artist Chapman Kelley lost 
 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 62. 
 120. Id. at 65. 
 121. See id. at 53 (acknowledging that courts do not discuss the rights that VARA guarantees be-
cause the cases are usually resolved on “threshold questions” like “whether the artist’s work is a work 
of visual art”). 
 122. 384 F. Supp. 2d 83, 84–85 (D.D.C. 2005). 
 123. Id. at 84 (alteration in original). 
 124. Id. at 85. 
 125. Id. (alteration in original). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 89. 
 128. Id. at 88. 
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his right of integrity action against the Chicago Park District because his Wild-
flower Works did not quality as a work of visual art.129  Kelley was nationally 
recognized for his paintings of landscapes and flowers.130  He designed a liv-
ing art piece for the Chicago Park District’s Grant Park titled Wildflower 
Works, which included “48 and 60 species of self-sustaining wildflowers na-
tive to the region[,] . . . selected for various aesthetic, environmental, and cul-
tural reasons.”131  “Kelley designed the initial placement of the wildflowers so 
they would blossom sequentially, changing colors throughout the growing 
season and increasing in brightness towards the center of each ellipse.”132  
Twenty years later, in order to make room for the development of a new Mil-
lennium Park, the Chicago Park District made changes to Grant Park and re-
configured Wildflower Works by decreasing its size by more than half and 
changing the shape of the flower beds from elliptical to rectangle.133  Kelley 
sued the Park District for violating his moral right of integrity under VARA 
because the Park District’s reconfiguration of Wildflower Works was “an in-
tentional ‘distortion, mutilation, or other modification’ of his work and was 
‘prejudicial to his . . . honor or reputation.’”134  Without addressing whether 
the Park District’s reconfiguration violated Kelley’s right of integrity, or de-
ciding whether Kelley’s Wildflower Works constituted a “painting or sculp-
ture” covered by VARA, the court held that Wildflower Works was not a 
“work of visual art.”135  Specifically, works that are “not subject to copyright 
protection” are excluded from the definition of a work of visual art, and the 
court found Wildflower Works to not be subject to copyright protection be-
cause it was neither authored (by a human) nor fixed in a tangible medium.136 
B. The Pressure to Expand the Moral Right of Integrity in the United States 
While VARA currently only applies to single-copy or limited-edition 
works of visual art and explicitly excludes certain expressive works from its 
 
 129. 635 F.3d 290, 306 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 130. Id. at 291. 
 131. Id. at 293. 
 132. Id. at 293. 
 133. Id. at 294–95. 
 134. Id. at 295. 
 135. Id. at 302–06. 
 136. Id. at 298–99, 304–06.  Under the definition of a “work of visual art,” works that are not subject 
to copyright protection are excluded.  Id. 
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subject matter, there has been consistent pressure for the United States to con-
sider expanding and broadening its protection of moral rights of authors.137  
Most recently, in response to the Register of Copyrights’, Maria Pallante, rec-
ommendation, the Ranking Member of the House Judiciary Committee re-
quested the U.S. Copyright Office to undertake a public study of moral rights 
to determine whether current laws are sufficient to protect the moral rights of 
creators.138  In January 2017, the U.S. Copyright Office commenced a formal 
study on moral rights, and sought public comment in a notice of inquiry to 
assess U.S. law’s recognition and protection of the moral rights of integrity 
and attribution for authors.139  In its notice of inquiry, the U.S. Copyright Of-
fice sought comment from the public on whether U.S. copyright law should 
consider additional moral rights protection and whether VARA has been ef-
fective in promoting and protecting the moral rights of authors of visual 
works.140  The U.S. Copyright Office further sought input from the public on 
whether “stronger protections for . . . the right of integrity implicate the First 
Amendment,” and “[i]f so, how should they be reconciled.”141 
In response, many interested individuals and interest- and industry-groups 
filed comments expressing concerns with an expanded moral rights and its 
effect on the United State’s long standing recognition of a strong right to free 
expression.142  For instance, the American Association of Law Libraries ex-
pressed the concern that expanding moral rights in the United States could 
undermine fair use: “Many uses favored by the fair use doctrine, such as satire 
and parody, would be undermined if moral rights protections . . . prevented 
uses the author regards as derogatory.”143  Similarly the Association of Amer-
ican Publishers (AAP) expressed concern with how an author’s right of integ-
 
 137. See, e.g., Symposium, AUTHORS, ATTRIBUTION, and INTEGRITY: Examining Moral Rights 
in the United States, 8 GEO. MASON J. INT’L COM. L. 1, 2 (2016); KWALL, supra note 55, at 147–65. 
 138. Moral Rights Study, supra note 34, at 7871.  The U.S. Copyright Office published its final 
report in April 2019 that concluded “that there is no need for the creation of a blanket moral rights 
statute at this time.”  U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 46. 
 139. Moral Rights Study, supra note 34, at 7875. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. See infra notes 143–47; see also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 46, at 9. 
 143. Letter from Emily Feltren, Am. Ass. of L. Libr, to Karyn Temple Clagget, Acting Register of 
Copyrights, U.S. Copyright Office (Mar. 29, 2017) (on file with regulations.gov), https://www.regu-
lations.gov/document?D=COLC-2017-0003-0021. 
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rity would interfere with long-standing fair use and First Amendment prece-
dent.144  Citing the Eleventh Circuit case SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin 
Co. as an example, the AAP considered whether Alice Randall’s parody The 
Wind Done Gone, which criticized Margaret Mitchell’s classic Gone With the 
Wind’s “romantic, idealized portrait of the antebellum South during and after 
Civil War,” would be excused under fair use had Mitchell’s estate brought a 
right of integrity claim against Randall.145  Finally, the Authors Alliance 
stressed the importance of recognizing a statutory recognition of fair use to a 
right of integrity.146  Specifically, 
If Congress granted . . . integrity rights to authors, this would impli-
cate First Amendment rights, interests, and values unless the . . . in-
tegrity rights were carefully cabined through limitations and excep-
tions.  Among the limitations and exceptions that could mitigate or 
avoid conflict with [the] First Amendment . . . would be a statutory 
recognition of fair use as a limitation on the rights, as currently rec-
ognized in VARA.  A follow-on creator who parodied a well-known 
popular song, such as the 2 Live Crew parody of Roy Orbison’s 
Pretty Woman, should, for example, be able to avoid liability for vi-
olating . . . integrity rights by raising a fair use defense.  Criti-
cally, . . . integrity rights should not constrain the ability of others to 
speak about an author or a work.147 
Some commenters believe that it would be easy to reconcile the First 
Amendment and right of integrity under fair use.148  As the American Society 
of Journalists and Authors stated, 
Thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands of times, U.S. courts have 
reconciled the First Amendment and challenges to the assignment of 
 
 144. Letter from Allan Robert Adler, Ass. of Am. Publishers, to Karyn Temple Clagett, Acting 
Register of Copyrights, U.S. Copyrights Office (Mar. 30, 2017) (on file with regulations.gov), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=COLC-2017-0003-0032. 
 145. Id. at 8–9. 
 146. Letter from Pamela Samuelson, President, Brianna Schofield, Executive Director, Authors Al-
liance, to Karyn Temple Clagett, Acting Register of Copyrights and Director 5 (May 30, 2017) (on 
file with regulations.gov), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=COLC-2017-0003-0028. 
 147. Id. (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). 
 148. See infra notes 149–51 and accompanying text; see also U.S. COPYRIGHTS OFFICE, supra note 
46, at 9. 
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economic rights and thorny questions of ‘fair use.’ . . .  
We have no reason to anticipate that our courts would have any dif-
ficulty integrating protections for the moral rights of authors with the 
First Amendment.149 
Similarly, the Kernochan Center for Law, Media and the Arts expressed 
confidence that “concerns about First Amendment rights” relating to an ex-
pansion of authors’ right of integrity “can be addressed by the established fair 
use doctrine.”150  Specifically, the Kernochan Center stated in its reply com-
ments: 
[T]he right of integrity is not inherently in tension with free expres-
sion. . . .  For example, if altering a work is found ‘fair’ because the 
change gives the work ‘new meaning or message,’ as the Second Cir-
cuit found in some art appropriation cases, the first author’s ‘honor 
or reputation’ remain unscathed precisely because the point is that the 
new message is not the first author’s message.  To the extent the new 
message casts the original message in an unflattering light, that con-
sequence would be no more actionable than would be the fallout from 
an unkind book review.151 
Others, such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), expressed un-
certainty over whether and how fair use could limit the moral right of integ-
rity.152  As EFF stated, “The integrity claim in particular contemplates an in-
herently transformative use that is unlikely to usurp the market for the 
original; most such uses are likely fair.  Creating a new right could cause 
 
 149. Letter from Sherry Beck Paprocki, President, Salley Shannon, past President and Advocacy 
Chair, American Society of Journalists and Authors, to U.S. Copyright Office 5 (Mar. 30, 2017) (on 
file with regulations.gov), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=COLC-2017-0003-0040. 
 150. Letter from June M. Beck, Executive Director, Jance C. Ginsburg, Faculty Director, Phillippa 
S. Leonard, Deputy Director, Kernochan Ctr. for Law., Media and the Arts Columbia Law Sch., to 
U.S. Copyright Office 9 (Mar. 31, 2017) (on file with regulations.gov), https://www.regula-
tions.gov/document?D=COLC-2017-0003-0042. 
 151. Letter from June M. Beck, Executive Director, Jance C. Ginsburg, Faculty Director, Phillippa 
S. Leonard, Deputy Director, Kernochan Ctr. for Law., Media and the Arts Columbia Law Sch., to 
U.S. Copyright Office 11 (May 16, 2017) (on file with regulations.gov), https://www.regula-
tions.gov/document?D=COLC-2017-0003-0054 (footnote omitted). 
 152. Letter from Kit Walsh & Mitch Stoltz, Electronic Frontier Foundation, to U.S. Copyright Of-
fice  (Mar. 30, 2017) (on file with regulations.gov), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=COLC 
-2017-0003-0035. 
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courts to restrict the scope of fair use to give the integrity right meaning.”153  
The Motion Picture Association of America expressed similar concerns about 
the moral right of integrity’s potential to chill expression.154  Specifically, it 
stressed: 
[I]t is far from clear how . . . a [fair use] defense would operate in 
practice.  Do proponents mean that if a use of the work itself is fair 
under traditional copyright fair use analysis, then there is also a com-
plete defense to a moral rights claim? . . . Would the analysis be con-
ducted using the familiar four factors set forth in § 107?  How would 
they even apply to a potential moral rights violation? . . . The vast 
degree of uncertainty surrounding these questions risks chilling 
speech.155 
Wendy Gordon warned: 
[T]he . . . expanded right of ‘integrity’ poses [a danger] to the fair use 
doctrine and the liberty it provides for criticism and parody.  The “in-
tegrity” right aims to preserve the feelings of an artist, but . . . those 
feelings—the distress at seeing one’s work disparaged and altered in 
a way that emphasizes its potential flaws—is not something that cop-
yright law is permitted to take into consideration.156 
Many of these concerns raised by interest groups regarding expansion of 
moral rights were focused on the potential for moral rights expansion to im-
plicate the First Amendment by chilling expression and discouraging creation 
 
 153. Id. at 3. 
 154. Letter from Benjamin S. Scheffner, Senior Vice President & Associate General Counsel, Mo-
tion Picture Association of America, Inc., to U.S. Copyright Office (May 15, 2017) (on file with reg-
ulations.gov), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=COLC-2017-0003-0056. 
 155. Id. at 9. 
 156. Letter from Wendy J. Gordon, to U.S. Copyright Office 2–3 (Mar. 31, 2017) (on file with 
regulations.gov), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=COLC-2017-0003-0043.  Gordon con-
tinued on to cite Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994):  
This distinction between potentially remediable displacement and unremediable disparage-
ment is reflected in the rule that there is no protectable derivative market for criticism.  The 
market for potential derivative uses includes only those that creators of original works 
would in general develop or license others to develop.  Yet the unlikelihood that creators 
of imaginative works will license critical reviews or lampoons of their own productions 
removes such uses from the very notion of a potential licensing market. 
[Vol. 47: 601, 2020] Creative Destruction 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
623 
of secondary or follow-on works.157  Many of those comments focused on the 
need for any expanded moral rights to be limited by the fair use doctrine, sim-
ilar to VARA.158  Some even point to VARA’s explicit statutory recognition 
of fair use as guidance on the limitation that an expanded moral rights statute 
should include.  Others expressed doubt that fair use could be compatible with 
the moral right of integrity.  Even commenters that were not concerned with 
an expanded right of integrity’s implications on expression relied on the fact 
that courts, through the fair use doctrine, could balance an author’s right of 
integrity with a follow-on creator’s free expression right.  In fact, in its final 
report published in April 2019, the United States Copyright Office admitted: 
[M]ore explicit protections for the right[] of integrity . . . in the 
United States may create tensions with the fair use doctrine . . . . 
. . . . 
[However,] any tensions between potential statutory moral rights pro-
tections and the fair use doctrine can be overcome through proper 
calibration of any statutory framework.159 
However, even though VARA is explicitly limited by fair use, there have 
been no court decisions involving a fair use defense to a right of integrity 
claim and no direction on how fair use would interact with a violation of in-
tegrity rights.160  As the United States continues to consider or discuss expand-
ing moral rights to cover, for instance, additional subject matter works such 
 
 157. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 46, at 28 (“[C]ommenters asked that the [U.S. Copy-
rights] Office consider the possibility that a right of integrity would impose an additional legal chilling 
effect on those publishers, authors, and scholars who critique the work of another author in a way that 
may damage the initial author’s reputation.”); e.g., Walsh & Stoltz, supra note 152, at 3; Scheffner, 
supra note 154, at 9. 
 158. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 46, at 32 (“Some [commenters] noted that applying 
fair use to moral rights protections, as is the case with moral rights afforded under VARA, would keep 
a statutory right of attribution or integrity from impinging on uses that courts should deem fair.”); e.g., 
Feltren, supra note 143, at 2. 
 159. U.S. COPYRIGHTS Office, supra note 46, at 30, 32. 
 160. But see U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 46, at 102 (some commenters described Dr. Seuss 
Enterprises v. Penguin Books USA, Inc. and Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co. “as seeking dam-
ages for infringements of economic rights as a ‘backdoor’ way of enforcing otherwise unenforceable 
moral rights . . . [that] illustrate the interaction between moral rights/derivative works claims and fair 
use”). 
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as literary, dramatic, artistic, musical, and audio-visual works, or reproduc-
tions and mass-produced works, the question of how fair use might limit the 
moral right of integrity must be resolved.161  In light of the ongoing discussion 
about expanding moral rights in the United States, the accompanying concern 
with its implications on free expression, and the current lack of any U.S. court 
decision on a fair use defense to a moral rights claim, the analysis in this Paper 
contributes to this important and timely discussion. 
III. FAIR USE 
VARA begins with the limitation “[s]ubject to section 107,” which cre-
ates a fair use defense to VARA claims.162  In spite of this specific fair use 
limitation in VARA, no court has yet adjudicated a fair use defense to a moral 
rights claim.163  Owing its origins to Justice Story’s opinion in Folsom v. 
Marsh in the mid-nineteenth century,164 § 107 of the Copyright Act sets forth 
four factors for a court to weigh to determine whether a defendant’s unauthor-
ized use of the plaintiff’s work is fair: 
(1) the purpose and character of the [defendant’s] use[;] . . . (2) the 
nature of the [plaintiff’s] work; (3) the amount and substantiality of 
the portion [defendant] used in relation to the [plaintiff’s] work as a 
whole; and (4) the effect of the [defendant’s] upon the potential mar-
ket for or value of the [plaintiff’s] work.165 
Courts have balanced, weighed, and applied those four factors in a number of 
infringement cases to excuse, for instance, defendants who copied authors’ 
works for parody or criticism,166 used authors’ expressions to communicate 
new messages,167 and adapted authors’ works for purposes of creating new 
 
 161. See infra Part III; see also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 46, at 63 (discouraging the 
expansion of artworks, such as musical works and sound recordings, protected under VARA because 
the expansion “would contradict the purpose of VARA”). 
 162. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012). 
 163. See infra Section III.B. 
 164. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). 
 165. 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 166. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578–94 (1994); Suntrust Bank v. 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1264–65, 1267–68 (11th Cir. 2001); Leibovitz v. Paramount 
Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 112–17 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 167. See, e.g., Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prod.’s, 353 F.3d 792, 806 (9th Cir. 2003); Mattel, 
Inc. v. Pitt, 229 F. Supp. 2d 315, 321–25 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
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artistic expression.168 
A. Transformative Use as Fair Use 
Under the first factor of fair use—the purpose and character of the use—
courts look at whether the defendant’s follow-on work transformed the origi-
nal.169 Where a defendant’s follow-on work transforms the original by 
“add[ing] something new, with a further purpose or different character, alter-
ing the first with new expression, meaning, or message,” the defendant’s use 
is often considered fair.170  For instance, in Blanch v. Koons, artist Jeff Koons 
created his Easyfun-Ethereal series of paintings by culling images from ad-
vertisements, scanning them, and digitally superimposing the advertising “im-
ages against backgrounds of pastoral landscapes.”171  He then copied the re-
sulting collages with paint on billboard-sized, ten feet by fourteen feet 
canvasses.172  One such image, Niagara, consisted of four pairs of women’s 
legs and feet hanging from the top of the work; two pairs of feet were bare 
and the other two were wearing slip-on heeled sandals.173  The legs were su-
perimposed over a pastoral image highlighted with pastries, including a plate 
of donuts, a tray of Danish pastries, and a large chocolate fudge brownie 
topped with ice cream.174  Koons testified that, through Niagara, 
[H]e intended to “comment on the ways in which some of our most 
basic appetites—for food, play, and sex—are mediated by popular 
images.  By re-contextualizing these fragments as I do, I try to compel 
the viewer to break out of the conventional way of experiencing a 
particular appetite as mediated by mass media.”175   
One of the pair of legs Koons included in Niagara came from a photograph 
 
 168. See, e.g., Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 253 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 169. See, e.g., Cambell, 510 U.S. at 578–94. 
 170. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579; see, e.g., Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 715, 740 (2011) (“[R]ecent decisions that unequivocally characterize the 
defendant’s use as transformative almost universally find fair use.”).  See generally Clark D. Asay, Is 
Transformative Use Eating the World?, 61 B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020). 
 171. 467 F.3d at 247. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 247, 261. 
 174. Id. at 247. 
 175. Id. (footnote omitted). 
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Koons scanned from Allure magazine.176  The image Koons copied, Silk San-
dals by Gucci, was a photo taken by Andrea Blanch, an accomplished profes-
sional fashion photographer, of a pair of legs resting on a man’s lap.177  Koons 
made minor adjustments to the legs, and included them as the second pair of 
legs from the left, forming the focal image of Niagara.178  Koons did not seek 
permission from Blanch; Blanch sued Koons for copyright infringement, and 
Koons raised the defense of fair use.179  In its analysis of the first fair use 
factor, the purpose and character of Koons’s use, the court found Koons’s use 
of Blanch’s photograph to be transformative because of “[t]he sharply differ-
ent objectives that Koons had in using, and Blanch had in creating, ‘Silk San-
dals’”;180 because Koons’s use of Blanch’s photograph was the “‘raw mate-
rial’ . . . in the furtherance of distinct creative or communicative 
objectives”;181 and because Koons’s work “adds something new, with a fur-
ther purpose of different character, altering the first with new expression, 
meaning, or message.”182  The court ultimately found Koons’s use to be fair.183 
In Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Productions, the photographer 
Thomas Forsythe developed a series of photographs entitled Food Chain Bar-
bie, which depicted nude Barbie dolls endangered by everyday kitchen appli-
ances, such as a malt machine, a fondue pot, and a casserole dish in a lit 
oven.184  Forsythe described his work as “an attempt to ‘critique . . . the ob-
jectification of women associated with [Barbie], and . . . [to] lambast . . . the 
conventional beauty myth and the societal acceptance of women as objects 
because this is what Barbie embodies.’”185  Mattel sued Forsythe for infring-
ing its copyright in Barbie.186  The court found Forsythe’s photographs to be 
parodies that “transform Barbie’s meaning” from “the ideal American 
woman” and “symbol of American girlhood” that Mattel had established, to a 
message about “Barbie’s [harmful] influence on gender roles and the position 
 
 176. Id. at 247–48. 
 177. Id. at 248. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 248–49. 
 180. Id. at 252. 
 181. Id. at 253. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 259. 
 184. 353 F.3d 792, 796 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 185. Id. (alterations in original). 
 186. Id. at 797. 
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of women in society.”187  The court found Forsythe’s use to be fair.188 
Similarly, in Cariou v. Prince, famous appropriation artist Richard Prince 
took several photographs from Patrick Cariou’s portrait and landscape pho-
tography book, Yes Rasta, altered those photos and incorporated them into 
Prince’s series of works titled Canal Zone.189  Cariou sued Prince for copy-
right infringement of Cariou’s Yes Rasta photographs.190  The court found 
twenty-five of Prince’s works to be transformative because they “manifest an 
entirely different aesthetic from Cariou’s photographs.  Where Cariou’s se-
rene and deliberately composed portraits and landscape photographs depict 
the natural beauty of Rastafarians and their surrounding environs, Prince’s 
crude and jarring works, on the other hand, are hectic and provocative.”191  
Therefore, according to the court, Prince’s follow-on works in Canal Zone 
exhibit “a different character, give Cariou’s photographs a new expression, 
and employ new aesthetics with creative and communicative results distinct 
from Cariou’s.”192  “Prince . . . ‘add[ed] something new’ and presented im-
ages with a fundamentally different aesthetic.”193  The court found Prince’s 
twenty-five transformative works to be fair use of Cariou’s photographs.194 
Even as fair use decisions in copyright infringement cases have increased 
over the past decades, which has provided follow-on creators with greater 
clarity and predictability in determining fair use,195 the applicability of fair use 
in moral rights cases has largely been overlooked.  The lack of case law inter-
preting how courts might balance an author’s moral right of integrity with the 
public’s rights to expression is particularly troubling in light of the ongoing 
pressure to expand moral rights in the United States.196  If moral rights are to 
be expanded, most interest- or industry-groups and commentators agree that 
those rights must be subject to fair use.197  However, without any guidance 
 
 187. Id. at 802. 
 188. Id. at 816. 
 189. 714 F.3d 694, 698 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 706. 
 192. Id. at 708. 
 193. Id. (alteration in original). 
 194. Id. at 712. 
 195. See Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 OHIO STATE L.J. 47, 48–49 (2012); Pamela Samu-
elson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2540–42 (2009). 
 196. See supra Section II.B. 
 197. See, e.g., Sag, supra note 195, at 50 (“Almost no one doubts that the fair use doctrine is, or 
should be, very important . . . .”). 
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from courts and, as discussed below, with commentators and legislative his-
tory doubting the compatibility of fair use with the right of integrity, how can 
the United States expand moral rights with the assumption that fair use would 
provide the proper balance between authors’ rights and the public’s rights?198 
B. Fair Use and Its (In)Compatibility with the Right of Integrity 
At first glance, the moral right of integrity that VARA grants to authors 
seems incompatible with fair use.  If the right of integrity is the right to “safe-
guard the author’s meaning and message” in an author’s work, then any use 
of the author’s work to parodize, satirize, criticize, or transform would neces-
sarily alter the author’s meaning and message in the work and harm the au-
thor’s honor and reputation.199  But, it is precisely the alteration of the meaning 
or message of an author’s work that would give rise to a fair use defense.  
Indeed, transforming the meaning or message of an author’s work to express 
a new meaning or message is the “very type of activity that the fair use doc-
trine intends to protect for the enrichment of society.”200 
As a preliminary matter, the seeming incompatibility between the moral 
right of integrity and fair use is familiar in other areas of copyright law.201  A 
prime example is the seeming incompatibility between fair use and an author’s 
exclusive right under copyright law to create derivatives.202  Specifically, un-
der copyright law, an author has the exclusive right to prepare derivative 
works based on their copyrighted work.203  “A ‘derivative work’ is a work 
based upon one or more preexisting works . . . in which a work may be recast, 
transformed, or adapted.”204  Derivative works are often created by transform-
ing underlying works into new works, such as producing a motion picture 
based on a book, or writing a sequel to a story or song.205  However, if the 
transformation of an underlying work creates a derivative, but transformation 
of the underlying work also weighs in favor of fair use, then at what point 
 
 198. See infra Section III.B. 
 199. Kwall, supra note 55, at 6–7; see also U.S. Copyrights Office, supra note 46, at 30–31 (“[T]he 
moral right of integrity protects an author’s work against any “derogatory action” that is damaging to 
the author’s honor or reputation.”). 
 200. Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (1990). 
 201. See Edward Lee, Fair Use Avoidance in Music Cases, 59 B.C. L REV. 1873, 1881 (2018). 
 202. Id. 
 203. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2012). 
 204. Id. § 101. 
 205. Id. 
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does the transformation of an author’s original work transition from being an 
infringement of a copyright owner’s exclusive right to create derivatives to a 
permissible fair use of the copyright owner’s work?206 
Courts and scholars have addressed this conflict between fair use and a 
copyright owner’s derivative rights.  For instance, in Castle Rock Entertain-
ment, Inc. v. Carol Publishing Group, Inc., the court explicitly addressed the 
“potential source of confusion in our copyright jurisprudence over the use of 
the term ‘transformative.’”207  After noting that the definition of a derivative 
work included any form which a work may be transformed, the court noted 
that “[a]lthough derivative works that are subject to the author’s copyright 
transform an original work into a new mode of presentation, such works—
unlike works of fair use—take expression for purposes that are not ‘transform-
ative.’”208  In Ty, Inc. v. Publications International Ltd., the court described 
the transformative use for purposes of fair use as “complementary” copying, 
and infringing derivative use as “substitutional” copying.209  The court ex-
plained: 
[C]opying that is complementary to the copyrighted work (in the 
sense that nails are complements of hammers) is fair use, but copying 
that is a substitute for the copyrighted work (in the sense that nails 
are substitutes for pegs or screws), or for derivative works from the 
copyrighted work, is not fair use.210   
R. Anthony Reese analyzed the tension between transformativeness and the 
 
 206. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 201, at 1881 ( “[If [a]n unauthorized derivative work would be in-
fringing, but an unauthorized transformative work could be a fair use[,] . . . how is transforming a 
work into a derivative work different from using a work to create a transformative work under fair 
use?”); 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT 12:34–35 (3d ed. Supp. 2011) (“On principle, 
the rule [of transformative use] threatens to undermine the balance that Congress struck in section 
106(2)’s derivative rights provision to give copyright owners exclusive control over transformative 
works to the extent that these works borrow copyrightable expression from the copyrighted work.”). 
 207. 150 F.3d 132, 143 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 208. Id. 
 209.  292 F.3d 512, 517–18 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 210. Id. at 517, 519 (citation omitted) (finding that “photographs of Beanie Babies are conceded to 
be derivative works, for which there may be a separate demand that Ty may one day seek to exploit, 
and so someone who without a license from Ty sold photographs of Beanie Babies would be an in-
fringer of Ty’s sculptural copyrights”); see also R. Anthony Reese, Transformativeness and the De-
rivative Work Right, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 467, 475–76 (2008) (discussing Ty, In. v. Publications 
Int’l Ltd.). 
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derivative work right and found that “courts clearly do not view the prepara-
tion of a derivative work as necessarily transformative, such that the prepara-
tion of a derivative work is necessarily more likely (given the favored status 
of transformative uses) to constitute fair use.”211  Similarly, Neil Weinstock 
Netanel studied appellate and district court fair use decisions between 1995 
and 2010 and found the following: 
[W]hat matters for determining whether a use is transformative is 
whether the use is for a different purpose than that for which the cop-
yrighted work was created.  It can help if the defendant modifies or 
adds news expressive form or content as well, but different expres-
sive purpose, not new expressive content, is almost always the key.212   
Matthew Sag explained how a transformative work differed from a derivative: 
[T]he assessment of transformativeness is not merely a question of 
the degree of difference between two works; rather, it requires a judg-
ment of the motivation and meaning of those differences. . . .  [For 
instance], the novel Pride and Prejudice and Zombies, which com-
bines Jane Austen’s original work with scenes involving zombies, 
cannibalism, and ninjas, would be considered a transformative par-
ody of the original . . . .  In contrast, a more traditional sequel would 
merely be an infringing derivative work.213 
 In spite of this conflict, courts have managed to balance authors’ deriva-
tive rights with follow-on creators’ rights to expression under fair use numer-
ous times in the past.  Therefore, if the incompatibility between an author’s 
exclusive right to prepare derivatives and fair use can be resolved in an ac-
ceptable manner on a case-by-case basis by the courts, then so too can the 
seeming incompatibility between the moral right of integrity and fair use, as 
detailed in Part III above.214 
Additionally, fair use and how it interacts with the right of integrity under 
VARA presents unique issues in light of VARA’s limited protection of single 
 
 211. Reese, supra note 210, at 494. 
 212. Netanel, supra note 170, at 747. 
 213. Sag, supra note 195, at 56. 
 214. See discussion supra Section III.B. 
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or limited-edition works.215  The mutilation of an original work to create new 
message or meaning could mean the permanent mutilation or distortion of the 
work.216  Indeed, commentators have questioned the compatibility of fair use 
with VARA’s moral right of integrity precisely because of this concern.  For 
instance, Jane Ginsburg questioned, “What is ‘fair’ about mutilating an origi-
nal (or one of a limited edition)?  What public policy does it advance; what 
public benefit does it secure? . . . [W]hat social need is there to destroy the 
original?”217  Similarly, Peter Karlen opined that fair use has a limited role in 
moral rights:  
A use may infringe upon an artist’s moral rights even though it falls 
into a fair use exception.  In part, this is because § 107, which codifies 
the fair use doctrine, sets forth considerations often having little to do 
with moral rights.  The use or misuse of a work for purposes such as 
news reporting, scholarship, criticism, review, or classroom teach-
ing . . . should not necessarily nullify a moral rights violation.”218   
Dane Ciolino argued that “federal moral rights and the fair use doctrine are 
manifestly incompatible for a number of doctrinal and practical reasons.”219  
According to Ciolino, these reasons include that VARA governs the relation-
ship between artist and personal property and not “nonrivalrous uses of intan-
gible copyrighted works,” that VARA governs personal rights that deserve 
greater respect, and that the § 107 factors do not work when applied to use of 
tangible property.220  One commenter pointed out that the language of § 107, 
which uses the words “including such use by reproduction in copies,”221 seems 
inconsistent with the fair use of a single-copy or limited-edition work.222  Ra-
 
 215. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 216. See discussion infra Section IV.A. 
 217. Visual Artists’ Rights Act of 1989: Hearing on H.R. 2690 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, 
Intellectual Prop., & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary House of Rep.’s, 101st 
Cong. 93 (1989) (statement of Jane Ginsburg, Associate Professor of Law, Columbia University 
School of Law). 
 218. Peter H. Karlen, What’s Wrong with VARA: A Critique of Federal Moral Rights, 15 HASTINGS 
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 905, 912–13 (1993). 
 219. Dane S. Ciolino, Rethinking the Compatibility of Moral Rights and Fair Use, 54 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 33, 37 (1997). 
 220. Id. 
 221. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 222. Thank you to James Gibson for pointing this out. 
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chel Buker described the inclusion of a fair use defense in VARA as “befud-
dling,” finding it “unclear just how fair use applies to moral rights.”223  Finally, 
Amy Adler remarked: 
I doubt a court would extend the [fair use] provisions very far in the 
case of a permanent alteration of a unique work of art.  The fair use 
concept seems to depend on copying.  The original remains intact.  
Permanently defacing someone’s work to create a new one seems far 
more troubling than market damages caused by unauthorized cop-
ies.224 
In fact, the legislative history of VARA showed that there was some doubt 
over whether and how fair use could apply to a moral rights claim: 
The Committee does not want to preclude fair use claims in this con-
text.  However, it recognizes that it is unlikely that such claims will 
be appropriate given the limited number of works covered by the Act, 
and given that the modification of a single copy or limited edition of 
a work of visual art has different implications for the fair use doctrine 
than does an act involving a work reproduced in potentially unlimited 
copies.225 
While these concerns are certainly legitimate, and it may appear cavalier 
to allow the permanent mutilation of an original work of art in the name of 
free expression, the right of integrity does not only apply to instances where 
an original work is permanently mutilated.  In its most expansive form, the 
right of integrity protects against the decontexualization of a work, such as 
placing Fearless Girl in front of Charging Bull, in addition to the physical 
mutilation of the work.226  Indeed, VARA explicitly protects against the dis-
tortion, modification, and mutilation of a work that prejudices an author’s 
 
 223. Rachel Buker, On Art Attacks: At the Confluence of Shock, Appropriation, and the Law, 14 J. 
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 393, 403 (2015). 
 224. Adler, supra note 27, at 281 n.99. 
 225. H.R. REP. NO. 101-514 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6932.  However, it is 
worthy to note that this statement occurred three years before the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., which found that the more transformative the follow-on work, 
the more likely the follow-on work would be considered fair use.  510 U.S. 569, 578–79 (1994). 
 226. See supra notes 1–11 and accompanying text.  But see infra note 229. 
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honor and reputation.227  For instance, Sergio Munoz Sarmiento believes that 
the right of integrity could have a more expansive application; he highlights 
the fact that VARA’s wording fails to explicitly limit the definition of muti-
lation to physical alterations.228  And even though VARA’s public presenta-
tion exception has been interpreted to excuse decontextualization of works 
from violating an author’s right of integrity,229 that exception may not excuse 
all decontextualizations now or in the future.  Indeed, if VARA is most con-
cerned with protecting an author’s honor and reputation, damage to an au-
thor’s honor and reputation could occur through decontextualization, tempo-
rary and impermanent modification, and physical mutilation of their work.  
Furthermore, as discussed below, the line between decontextualization ex-
cused under the public presentation exception and decontextualization not ex-
cused under the public presentation exception can be easily blurred.230  The 
line between permanent mutilation and impermanent mutilation is similarly 
thin.231  For instance, if spraying paint on a concrete sculpture prejudices the 
sculpture’s honor and reputation, does it matter whether the paint may or may 
not be removable?  If—under the public presentation exception—VARA ex-
cuses a shopping mall from tying red ribbons on sculptures of geese because 
the ribbons are impermanent, does it make a difference if the mall owners 
never remove the red ribbons?  As I explore below, some actions by follow-
on creators that may fall under VARA’s public presentation exception might 
be more appropriately analyzed under fair use.232  There are contexts where a 
 
 227. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A) (2012). 
 228. Isaac Kaplan, Fearless Girl Face-off Poses a New Question: Does the Law Protect an Artist’s 
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Copyright and the Regulation of Intertextuality, 9 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 293, 326 (2019) (stating that 
the public presentation exception to VARA’s right of integrity “does not give artists the right to pre-
vent so-called contextual modifications—defined as those that ‘leave the substance of the work intact, 
but change the appearance or perception of the work by putting it into a context that differs from the 
one originally intended or envisioned by the author’”). 
 230. See discussion infra Section IV.A. 
 231. See discussion infra Section IV.B. 
 232. See discussion infra Sections IV.A–B. 
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follow-on creator can only express an important message or meaning by dis-
torting the original or limited-edition work.233 
Moreover, even though VARA explicitly makes the moral right of integ-
rity “[s]ubject to section 107[’s]” fair use provision,234 other common law 
countries that protect the moral rights of authors do not provide an explicit 
defense of fair use (or fair dealing)235 to moral rights claims.236  This does not 
mean, however, that fair use is incompatible with the moral right of integrity 
or that courts in those countries do not consider whether the defendant’s use 
is fair in moral rights litigation.237  For instance, certain countries, such as 
Australia, provide a defense to defendants where the violation of moral rights 
is “reasonable in all the circumstances.”238  At present, there are no cases con-
firming whether courts would find the distortion, mutilation, or modification 
of a work for purpose of parody, satire, or criticism to be “reasonable in all 
the circumstances.”239  Furthermore, in Deckmyn v. Vandersteen, mentioned 
above, the Belgium Court of Appeals considered whether the follow-on work 
in that case would be excused under the parody exception under Belgian 
law.240  In light of this important question, the court sent the question to the 
European Court of Justice to consider whether parody is a defense under Eu-
ropean Union law, and if so, what constitutes a parody.241  This seems to signal 
a willingness to consider parody as a defense to moral rights. 
Finally, in spite of the explicit reference to fair use as a defense to VARA 
 
 233. See discussion infra Section IV.C. 
 234. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) (2012). 
 235. See, e.g., supra note 44.  Common law nations such as Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, 
and New Zealand apply the defense of fair dealing to copyright claims.  See id.  Fair dealing has been 
described as a narrower defense that is only applicable to a set of enumerated purposes, such as parody 
or satire.  Giuseppina D’Agostino, Healing Fair Dealing?  A Comparative Copyright Analysis of Can-
ada’s Fair Dealing to U.K. Fair Dealing and U.S. Fair Use, 53 MCGILL L.J. 309, 318 (2008).  The 
U.S. applies the defense of fair use to copyright claims, which is more flexible and can apply to any 
purpose.  Id.  But see Ariel Katz, Debunking the Fair Use vs. Fair Dealing Myth: Have We Had Fair 
Use All Along, LAWARXIV PAPERS (July 2, 2018), https://osf.io/preprints/lawarxiv/26vjt. 
 236. See Sainsbury, supra note 16, at 149. 
 237. E.g., Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) pt IX div 6 s 195AS (Austl.); see also D’Agostino, supra note 
235, at 338–39 (describing U.K. copyright law as involving a three-step test a defendant must over-
come in copyright litigation). 
 238. Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) pt IX div 6 s 195AS. 
 239. Id. 
 240. See supra text accompanying notes 79–83. 
 241. See supra note 83. 
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claims, no court in the United Sates has found a fair use defense in this con-
text.242  This lack of case law, however, could be attributable to multiple rea-
sons other than its incompatibility.  First, VARA has only been enforceable 
since 1990 and covers a limited subject matter: works of visual art.243  This 
means that there is still relatively little litigation over VARA claims244 and 
much fewer court decisions on VARA claims compared to copyright infringe-
ment claims.245  Additionally, while some defendants in VARA claims have 
asserted fair use as an affirmative defense to right of integrity claims, courts 
often dispose of VARA claims on other grounds, such as the public presenta-
tion exception,246 or they interpret VARA to exclude protection of certain 
works.247  For instance, in Massachusetts Museum of Contemporary Art Foun-
dation, Inc. v. Büchel, Büchel claimed, among other things, that the museum’s 
covering of his unfinished work and allowing visitors to see his work dis-
played covered with a tarp violated his right of integrity.248  In response to 
Büchel’s claim, MASS MoCA asserted a number of affirmative defenses—
one of which was fair use.249  In that case, however, the court disposed of 
Büchel’s claim under the public presentation exception, stating that “the mere 
covering of the artwork by the Museum, its host, cannot reasonably be deemed 
an intentional act of distortion or modification of Büchel’s creation.”250  Be-
cause of this ruling, the court never analyzed the merits of the parties’ dispute; 
nor did the court analyze the museum’s actions under the factors of fair use.251 
 
 242. See supra Section II.B. 
 243. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012). 
 244. See Bonneau, supra note 46, at 100 n.257 (“[C]ase law of this nature is undeveloped.”). 
 245. See Christopher A. Cotropia & James Gibson, Copyright’s Topography: An Empirical Study 
of Copyright Litigation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1981, 1997–98 (2014) (comparing copyright infringement 
claims under 17 U.S.C. § 106 to other copyright actions, including VARA claims, and finding claims 
for unauthorized reproduction of work under § 106(1) were the most common while claims under 
VARA were the most rare). 
 246. See Mass. Museum of Contemporary Art Found., Inc. v. Büchel, 593 F.3d 38, 46–47 (1st Cir. 
2010). 
 247. See, e.g., Cheffins v. Stewart, 825 F.3d 588, 595 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding a mobile replica of a 
sixteenth-century Spanish galleon, created from an old school bus, to be applied art excluded from the 
definition of visual art under VARA); Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 459 F.3d 128, 142–43 
(1st Cir. 2006) (holding that VARA does not protect site-specific art). 
 248. Büchel, 459 F.3d at 42. 
 249. Plaintiff’s Reply to Defendant’s Counterclaims Mass. Museum of Contemporary Art Found., 
Inc. v. Büchel, 565 F. Supp. 2d 245 (D. Mass. July 12, 2017) (No. 3:07-cv-30089). 
 250. Büchel, 593 F.3d at 61. 
 251. Id. at 65. 
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Furthermore, where it relates specifically to follow-on creators modifying 
an original artist’s work for the sake of expression, another reason there are 
no published decisions on fair use in right of integrity claims might be because 
social norms resolve many of those disputes.252  For instance, in 2009, street 
artist Banksy mutilated a 1985 work by street artist King Robbo on the Re-
gents Canal in London.253  Banksy mutilated Robbo’s work by painting an 
image of a workman wall-papering over Robbo’s artwork.254  In response, 
Robbo changed the image of Banksy’s work to look like the workman was 
painting the tag “King Robbo.”255  Banksy changed the image again, and 
Robbo responded by painting over the work with a cartoon character leaning 
against a tombstone that said “R.I.P. Banksy’s Career.”256  Famous feuds be-
tween street artists, such as the feud between Banksy and Robbo, are examples 
of artists relying on social norms instead of moral rights litigation to resolve 
their disputes.257  Some artists even welcome other artists’ use of their works 
for the sake of encouraging and creating expression.258  For instance, in 1953, 
Robert Rauschenberg took an original Willem de Kooning work of art and 
erased it.259  This resulted in “a sheet of paper bearing the faint, ghostly 
shadow of its former markings,” which Rauschenberg titled Erased de Koo-
ning Drawing and exhibited.260  While this action, if it occurred today and de 
Kooning were alive, would certainly violate de Kooning’s moral right of in-
tegrity, de Kooning—in fact—gifted Rauschenberg the work to erase.261  
When de Kooning finally understood and relented to Rauschenberg’s artistic 
intent, de Kooning did not just gift Rauschenberg any work, he specifically 
 
 252. See infra text accompanying notes 253–62. 
 253. Cathay Y. N. Smith, Street Art: An Analysis Under U.S. Intellectual Property Law and Intel-
lectual Property’s “Negative Space” Theory, 24 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 259, 279 
(2014). 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. at 279–80. 
 256. Id. at 280.  See also The Banksy vs Robbo War in Pictures, TWISTED SIFTER (Jan. 12, 2012), 
https://twistedsifter.com/2012/01/banksy-vs-robbo-war-in-pictures/. 
 257. See Smith, supra note 253, at 279 (“The ultimate offense in street art is writing over someone 
else’s work.  When this rule is not observed, street artists often take to the streets to punish each other 
for failure to follow normative street art rules, resulting in street art ‘feuds.’”). 
 258. Robert Rauschenberg, Erased de Kooning Drawing, 1953, SFMOMA, https://www.sfmoma. 
org/artwork/98.298/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2019). 
 259. Id. 
 260. Adler, supra note 27, at 283. 
 261. Abigail Cain, Why Robert Rauschenberg Erased a De Kooning, ARTSY (July 14, 2017, 2:47 
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went through his portfolio to find “something [he would] miss.”262 
In spite of its seeming incompatibility, the lack of any case law or inter-
national equivalents, this Paper argues that fair use can and should be used to 
limit authors’ integrity claims in the United States.263  This determination can 
be made by creatively analyzing and balancing the four factors under § 107, 
similar to the analysis of fair use in copyright infringement claims.264  In light 
of the ongoing pressure to expand moral rights in the U.S., it is important to 
understand how fair use can and should balance the interests of authors’ rights 
to the integrity in their works with the interests of the public in having access 
to new expression.265 
IV. FAIR USE AND THE DISTORTION, MUTILATION,  
OR OTHER MODIFICATION OF WORKS 
The moral right of integrity gives authors the right “to prevent any inten-
tional distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that work which would 
be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation.”266  This Part analyzes three 
different contexts that could violate an author’s right of integrity.  The first 
involves instances where the follow-on creator distorts, mutilates, or modifies 
the meaning of an author’s work without physically altering the work, such as 
where the placement of a piece of art interacts with, decontextualizes, or 
clearly comments upon an author’s original work.267  This decontextualization 
could be temporary or permanent.268  The second context is where a follow-
on creator distorts, mutilates, or modifies an artist’s work by physically—but 
temporarily or impermanently—altering the work,269 such as placing ribbons 
on a sculpture270 or partially covering a piece of art with tarp or curtains.271  
The final context involves a follow-on creator who permanently distorts, mu-
tilates, or modifies a physical copy of an artist’s work in order to make an 
 
 262. Id. 
 263. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 264. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 265. See Samuelson, supra note 195, at 2540 for a description of the strength of the fair use doctrine 
as balancing interests of copyright owners with interests of subsequent authors and the public. 
 266. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A) (2012). 
 267. See discussion infra Section IV.A. 
 268. See discussion infra Section IV.A. 
 269. See discussion infra Section IV.B. 
 270. See infra notes 343–46 and accompanying text. 
 271. See infra notes 333–40 and accompanying text. 
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artistic, social, or political statement, such as erasing a painting, drawing 
clown faces on serious portraits, or spray-painting derogatory language on a 
sculpture.272  This permanent distortion could be of a single-copy work or a 
limited-edition work.273  This Part examines how copyright’s fair use doctrine 
can flexibly serve as a limitation to integrity rights under those three contexts 
and interprets how the four fair use factors in § 107 may be used to balance 
the author’s right of integrity with the public’s rights to find fair use where a 
follow-on creator modifies, distorts, or mutilates an author’s work to trans-
form the work and give the work new meaning. 
A. Decontextualization 
The first context that could violate the moral right of integrity, under an 
expansive view of moral rights, involves the distortion, mutilation, or modifi-
cation of the context or meaning of an author’s work.  In this category, the 
follow-on creator does nothing to physically alter the author’s work, but 
through some permanent or temporary action, distorts, modifies, or mutilates 
the context or original meaning of the author’s work, thereby prejudicing the 
artist’s honor and reputation.274  A recent example of this scenario involved 
the dispute between artist Arturo Di Modica, creator of the Charging Bull 
sculpture on Wall Street, and Kristen Visbal’s Fearless Girl sculpture.275 
On December 16, 1989, New York financial operators arrived at the New 
York Stock Exchange to find a 7,700 pound, eleven foot tall, sixteen foot long 
bronze sculpture of a charging bull installed across the street.276  Di Modica 
had installed the Charging Bull street art guerilla-style, under cover of 
night.277  The Charging Bull represented “optimism and strength amid adver-
sity” at a time when the U.S. stock market was experiencing a crash.278  In 
response to its immediate popularity, instead of removing or destroying 
 
 272. See infra Section IV.C. 
 273. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 274. See, e.g., supra notes 1–7 and accompanying text. 
 275. Tom McCarthy, Fearless Girl v Charging Bull: New York’s Biggest Public Art Controversy in 
Years, GUARDIAN (Apr. 14, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/apr/14/fearless-girl-
statue-women-new-york-bull. 
 276. Tiziano Thomas Dossena, A New York Story: How the Charging Bull “Chose” Wall Street, 
BRIDGE PUGLIA USA (Feb. 2018), http://www.bridgepugliausa.it/articolo.asp?id_sez=2&id_cat=37
&id_art=3483&lingua=en. 
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 278. Id.  
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Charging Bull, the New York City Department of Parks and Recreation tem-
porarily installed it on the cobblestone-paved square of Bowling Green where 
it remains today.279  On March 7, 2017,280 almost twenty-eight years later, 
State Street Global Advisors installed artist Kristen Visbal’s sculpture, Fear-
less Girl, twenty feet away from Charging Bull.281  The Fearless Girl weighed 
250 pounds and stood about four feet tall; she stood defiant and straight, hands 
on her hips, feet planted on the ground, her ponytail and skirt seemed to billow 
in the wind.282  She faced Charging Bull head on.283  Fearless Girl intended to 
send a message about gender diversity and equality and to “[k]now the power 
of women in leadership” at a time when the media was heightening its focus 
and scrutiny on gender inequality on Wall Street.284  Di Modica claimed that 
Fearless Girl “was an insult to his work,” and that “[s]he’s there attacking the 
bull.”285  The placement of Fearless Girl—standing defiantly and facing 
Charging Bull head-on—certainly “subverted the bull’s meaning,” which was 
to promote “freedom in the world, peace, strength, power[,] and love.”286  In-
deed, even though Fearless Girl did not physically alter Di Modica’s work, it 
clearly interacted with it, and certainly reinterpreted Charging Bull’s original 
positive and uplifting message showing “the strength and power of the Amer-
ican people”287 by casting a menacing light onto the sculpture and transform-
ing it “into a negative force and a threat” connoting antifeminism and disem-
powerment of women.288 
Under the current interpretation of VARA, the installation of Fearless 
Girl and her deliberate interaction with Charging Bull is not likely to support 
a cause of action for violating Di Modica’s right of integrity.289  In the United 
 
 279. Dossena, supra note 276. 
 280. Lisa Marie Segarra, The Fearless Girl Statue Won’t Be Staring Down The Charging Bull An-
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States, the public presentation exception in VARA exempts from a right of 
integrity violation “[t]he modification of a work of visual art which is the re-
sult . . . of the public presentation, including lighting and placement, of the 
work.”290  Specifically, modification because of public presentation “is not a 
destruction, distortion, mutilation, or other modification . . . unless the modi-
fication is caused by gross negligence.”291  Not all scholars agree that the pub-
lic presentation exception will exempt non-physical alterations of a work; as 
Sergio Munoz Sarmiento points out, the statute’s wording does not explicitly 
limit the definition of mutilation to physical alterations.292  However, based 
on past case law and legislative history, the mere presentation of another’s 
work next to the author’s work may be exempt from VARA under its public 
presentation exception.293  This exception, for instance, allows museums to 
exercise their curatorial discretion to place works next to each other—to allow 
the works to interact with each other—in order to exhibit a specific message 
or meaning, even if that message could harm an artist’s honor or reputation.294  
This exception also permitted a property developer to erect a building to com-
pletely obstruct a mural in English v. BFC & R East 11th Street LLC.295  In-
deed, Annemarie Bridy explores the dispute between Charging Bull and Fear-
less Girl and finds Di Modica’s claim under VARA to be “bull.”296  “To the 
extent that Fearless Girl’s presence in Bowling Green Park modifies the mean-
ing of Charging Bull for either DiModica himself or members of the public, 
that modification in no way violates DiModica’s right of integrity under 
VARA” given VARA’s focus on physical alterations and given VARA’s pub-
lic presentation exception.297  Amy Adler further explained, “We don’t want 
to let artists start suing curators because they don’t like who their work is 
displayed next to.”298 More importantly, “A policy that would allow one artist 
 
2018/02/article_0003.html (“[T]here is general agreement that VARA would not protect the Charging 
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 295. English v. BFC & R E. 11th St. LLC, No. 97 Civ. 7446(HB), 1997 WL 746444, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. 
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to stop another artist’s work would be a mistake[;] . . .  [a]ll public art is ide-
ally in dialogue with the space it exists in.  And that includes other sculp-
tures.”299 
That being said, as discussed above, under a more expansive interpreta-
tion of the moral right of integrity, decontextualization of an author’s work 
that causes prejudice to that author’s honor and reputation could be considered 
a distortion, modification, or mutilation of the author’s work and could sup-
port a cause of action for violating the author’s right of integrity.300  For in-
stance, in the Stockholm District Court decision mentioned above, the court 
found an author’s right of integrity to be violated where his work was exhib-
ited next to highly pornographic photos.301  If the United States were to expand 
the scope of VARA to mirror countries that hold this more expansive view of 
moral rights, this type of decontextualization of works could give rise to a 
right of integrity claim.302 
Additionally, there could be instances where it is difficult to draw the line 
between decontextualization due to public presentation and decontextualiza-
tion due to other actionable modifications of works.303  As Merryman ex-
plains: 
It seems undeniable that an exhibition can be stacked, whether delib-
erately or not, so as to misrepresent the artist’s work.  This could ad-
versely affect the artist’s reputation and thus arguably impair his 
moral right.  But to ask a court to intervene is to suggest something 
close to, if not indistinguishable from, censorship.  Just as one would 
be reluctant to suggest judicial suppressing or “editing” of a book 
that, in the selection of paintings illustrated and in the text, misrepre-
sented a painter’s work, so one ought to avoid similar suppression or 
“editing” of an exhibition.  Yet if one agrees with this argument, how 
is it possible to support a right of integrity at all?  Is there a convenient 
line to be drawn between the kinds of mistreatment of the artist’s 
work that ought to be legally prevented and other kinds for which, in 
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 300. See supra text accompanying notes 226–27. 
 301. Brown-Pedersen, supra note 76, at 127. 
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order to protect freedom of expression or other overriding social in-
terests, no such legal remedy is available?  The instinctive response 
is that there is such a line, at least in the sense that most cases fall 
clearly into one or the other category, but experience leads us to ex-
pect that there will be difficult cases, just as there are difficult cases 
wherever legal lines must be drawn.304 
 Take the Charging Bull and Fearless Girl dispute as an example.305  What 
if the Fearless Girl was not placed twenty feet away from the Charging Bull; 
imagine if Fearless Girl was, instead, placed a mere one foot away from the 
Charging Bull, allowing the Charging Bull to tower over the Girl?  Or, imag-
ine if Fearless Girl was a mere one foot away from Charging Bull, raising 
one hand high in front of her that physically touches the Bull’s nose to seem-
ingly hold back or halt the Bull’s forward charge.  Or, imagine if Visbal had 
created Fearless Girl to fit atop Charging Bull, so that she appears to be riding 
and taming the Bull.  All of these scenarios would distort and modify Charg-
ing Bull, change the message of Charging Bull, and prejudice Di Modica’s 
honor or reputation—but would all of these scenarios be excused under 
VARA’s public presentation exception?  Do we draw the line at “physical” 
interaction?  In other words, as long as Fearless Girl sculpture does not phys-
ically interact with the Charging Bull, is it excused under public presentation?  
So, the scenario of Fearless Girl riding Charging Bull would not be excused 
under the public presentation exception, but placing the Girl one foot away 
from the Bull, allowing the Bull to seemingly tower over the Girl but not make 
any physical contact, would be excused.306  However, if we draw the line at 
physical interaction, does that mean that the scenario of the Girl touching the 
Bull’s nose would also not be excused under the public presentation exception 
merely because her hand physically interacts with the Bull?  What if her hand 
is a mere one inch away from the Bull, making it appear like she is touching 
him when, upon closer inspection, there is a one inch gap?  Drawing the line 
at physical interaction can seem arbitrary, especially if the purpose of the right 
of integrity is to safeguard an author’s honor and reputation.  An author’s 
honor and reputation can be prejudiced in all of the actions above, even where 
the interaction with another piece of art is not physical. 
What seems clearer, however, is that all of the scenarios imagined above 
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could support a defense of fair use.  Fair use guarantees breathing space within 
the confines of copyright307 and, as VARA explicitly states, also provides 
breathing space within the confines of moral rights.308  As Annemarie Bridy 
explained: “Without fair use, ‘unfaithful continuations’ and other antagonistic 
intertexts would be subject to veto by authors whose aesthetics skew mono-
logic.”309  The four factors, illustrated in § 107, to determine whether fair use 
excuses a follow-on creator’s work are, 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use 
is of commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) 
the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality 
of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; 
and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of 
the copyrighted work.310   
Under all of the Charging Bull versus Fearless Girl scenarios discussed 
above, the first factor—purpose and character of the use—would weigh in 
favor of fair use.  In all of the scenarios above, Fearless Girl’s interaction and 
reinterpretation or recontextualization of the Charging Bull alters the meaning 
and message of the Bull.311  They change the Bull’s message from one of op-
timism on Wall Street to a message criticizing the gender gap on Wall Street 
and proclaiming the strength of women.312  Like Randall’s book The Wind 
Done Gone, which transformed the message and meaning in Mitchell’s Gone 
With the Wind in Suntrust v. Houghton Mifflin,313 so too does Fearless Girl 
transform the message and meaning in Charging Bull.314  Indeed, altering the 
meaning of an original work, transforming the meaning or message of that 
work so it expresses a new meaning or message, is the “very type of activity 
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that the fair use doctrine intends to protect for the enrichment of society.”315   
 The second factor of fair use looks at the nature of the copyrighted work, 
specifically examining “whether the work is expressive or creative . . . or 
more factual, with a greater leeway being allowed to a claim of fair use where 
the work is factual or informational.”316  Courts in the past have acknowledged 
that sculptural works, such as Di Modica’s Charging Bull, are expressive and 
creative in nature.317  However, the creative nature of an author’s work is given 
limited weight in fair use analysis where the follow-on work uses “the original 
‘in a transformative manner to comment on [a work’s] social and aesthetic 
meaning rather than to exploit its creative virtues.’”318  Because Fearless Girl 
comments on Di Modica’s “social and aesthetic meaning” rather than “exploit 
its creative virtues,” the creative and expressive nature of Charging Bull 
would be given limited weight.319   
 Similarly, the third factor—amount and substantiality used—would also 
be given less weight because of Fearless Girl’s use of Charging Bull to ex-
press a new message and meaning.320  Indeed, in order to express the message 
for female equality on Wall Street, it was necessary to use the entire Charging 
Bull sculpture to get that message across.321   
 Finally, the fourth factor of fair use is “the effect of the use upon the po-
tential market for or value of the . . . work,” which examines “whether unre-
stricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in . . . would result in a 
substantially adverse impact on the potential market.”322  Here, it is possible 
 
 315. Leval, supra note 200, at 1111 (1990).  While Fearless Girl was created by an artist and high-
lights the gender gap in Wall Street, it may also be considered an advertisement expressing pure com-
mercial speech.  See Kaplan, supra note 228.  Specifically, the work promotes SSGA’s exchange-
traded fund, SHE.  Id.  As Di Modica’s attorney pointed out: “If an artist had put the girl there just for 
its message, it would be a different situation.  But those aren’t the facts.”  Id.  This Paper puts that 
commercial argument aside to focus specifically on the transformative message and meaning of Fear-
less Girl. 
 316. Gaylord v. United States, 595 F.3d 1364, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 317. See, e.g., id. 
 318. Id. (quoting Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 257 (2d Cir. 2006)). 
 319. See id. 
 320. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (“[T]he more transformative 
the new work, the less will be the significance of the other factors . . . that may weigh against a finding 
of fair use.”). 
 321. See Bridy, supra note 229, at 305 (“Charging Bull is a ‘necessary element’ to State Street’s 
politically engaged art project . . . .  [w]ithout Charging Bull as an interlocuter, Fearless Girl is just a 
statue of a little girl standing with her chin in the air and her hands on her hips.”). 
 322. Gaylord, 595 F.3d at 1375. 
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that the appreciation or even the market for Di Modica’s Charging Bull may 
decrease due to Fearless Girl’s negative message.323  This type of market 
harm, however, “like a scathing theater review” may “kill[] demand for the 
original,” but is not the type of market harm considered under fair use.324  In-
deed, even though Fearless Girl may disparage Charging Bull or Di Modica, 
such “[b]iting criticism that [merely suppresses] demand” is not “a harm cog-
nizable under the Copyright Act.”325 
While decontextualization of an author’s work may not be a violation of 
the author’s right of integrity under VARA in light of its public presentation 
exception, this may not always be the case if we expand moral rights.326  Ad-
ditionally, the line between what is excused activity under the public presen-
tation exception and what is not excused activity under the exception can also 
be a bit arbitrary.327  In situations where the public presentation exception may 
not clearly apply and a follow-on creator decontextualizes an author’s work 
by distorting, mutilating, or modifying it to give the work new meaning or 
message, courts, litigants, and authors should consider whether the fair use 
doctrine may limit the follow-on creator’s liability under the moral right of 
integrity. 
B. Temporary or Impermanent Distortion, Mutilation, or Modification 
The second context that may violate the moral right of integrity, under an 
expansive view of moral rights, involves the temporary or impermanent phys-
ical distortion, mutilation, or modification of an author’s work.  Unlike the 
first category, where the defendant does not physically alter the artist’s work, 
this category involves the defendant physically—but temporarily—distorting, 
mutilating, or modifying the artist’s work.328  Even though the distortion may 
 
 323. See Bridy, supra note 229, at 305. 
 324. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591–92. 
 325. Id. at 592 (alterations in original) (quoting Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1986)). 
 326. See supra notes 152–56 and accompanying text. 
 327. See discussion in supra Section IV.A.  
 328. See, e.g., Eastwood, supra note 84. 
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be temporary, the damage to the artist’s honor and reputation may be perma-
nent.329  This circumstance was presented in MASS MoCA v. Büchel330 and 
Snow v. Eaton Centre Ltd.331  Neither alteration was permanent, but both art-
ists claimed that their honor and reputation were damaged.332 
In MASS MoCA v. Büchel, the artist Büchel asserted a claim under VARA 
for violation of his right of integrity against MASS MoCA when MASS 
MoCA displayed the artist’s incomplete sculptural work covered with a 
tarp.333  The artist and MASS MoCA entered into an agreement to create and 
display Büchel’s sculptural work, Training Ground for Democracy.334  MASS 
MoCA funded the art, it went over budget, and the artist refused to continue 
the work because of artistic differences.335  Instead of destroying the work, 
MASS MoCA covered it with a tarp and invited audiences to walk past the 
covered work to attend its Made at MASS MoCA exhibit, which was an exhibit 
focusing on the collaboration between artists and museums.336  The court in 
MASS MoCA held that displaying Büchel’s unfinished work covered under a 
tarp was not an intentional act of distortion or modification of Büchel’s crea-
tion.337  The court admitted that MASS MoCA was not “necessarily acting 
with pure intentions when it created ‘Made at MASS MoCA’ in close prox-
imity to the tarped ‘Training Ground.’”338  Indeed, the court surmised that the 
museum was likely using the covered art to criticize Büchel and to communi-
cate its anger at the artist by “juxtaposing his unfinished work with the suc-
cessful artistic collaborations depicted in its new exhibition.”339  The court 
interpreted MASS MoCA’s act to be “intended to highlight, rather than hide, 
the failed collaboration.”340  However, the court found the museum’s action 
 
 329. See id. (explaining that three art experts testified that the owner decorating Snow’s geese with 
Christmas ribbons “ma[de] a mockery of [the work’s] intended purpose by distorting its appearance, 
transforming it into a ‘kitschy’ sentimental display, resembling a Christmas bauble,” which prejudiced 
“Snow’s artistic honour and reputation”). 
 330. Büchel, 593 F.3d at 45. 
 331. Snow v. The Eaton Centre Ltd. (1982) 70 C.P.R. (2d) 105 (Can. Ont. H.C.J.). 
 332. Büchel, 593 F.3d at 46; see Eastwood, supra note 84. 
 333. Büchel, 593 F.3d at 46. 
 334. Id. at 43. 
 335. Id. at 44–45. 
 336. Id. at 45. 
 337.  Id. at 61. 
 338. Id. 
 339. Id. at 62. 
 340. Id. 
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not to violate the right of integrity, because the right does not protect the artist 
“from disparaging commentary about his behavior.”341  It only protects from 
the “intentional act of distortion or modification” of the artist’s work.342 
In the Canadian case Snow v. Eaton Centre, the artist of Flight Stop—a 
sculpture consisting of sixty flying/hanging geese—sued the owner of the 
work for displaying the work with red holiday ribbons around the geese’s 
necks.343  The artist, Michael Snow, felt that the addition of the ribbons “jarred 
the harmony of his naturalistic composition, altered its basic character and 
purpose, and ultimately affected his artistic reputation.”344  He sued Eaton 
Centre, and the court ordered the Centre to remove the red ribbons.345  In ad-
dition to the artist’s own statement that the ribbons prejudiced his honor and 
reputation, the court relied on the artist’s experts that testified to the harm to 
Snow’s reputation, including that the red ribbons made “a mockery of its in-
tended purposes” and transformed the work “into a ‘kitschy’ sentimental dis-
play, resembling a Christmas bauble.”346 
In the U.S., however, Eaton Centre’s actions might be excused under the 
public presentation exception.347  Specifically, the House Report on the hear-
ings on VARA stated: 
Under subsection (c)(2), galleries and museums continue to have nor-
mal discretion to light, frame, and place works of art.  However, con-
duct that goes beyond presentation of a work to physical modification 
of it is actionable.  For example, Representative Markey described 
the actions of two Australian entrepreneurs who cut Picasso’s “Trois 
Femmes” into hundreds of pieces and sold them as “original Picasso 
pieces.”  This is clearly not a presentation question.  On the other 
hand, the Committee believes that the presentation exclusion would 
operate to protect a Canadian shopping center that temporarily be-
decked a sculpture of geese in flight with ribbons at Christmas 
 
 341. Id. 
 342. Id. 
 343. See Snow v. The Eaton Centre Ltd. (1982) 70 C.P.R. (2d) 105 (Can. Ont. H.C.J.); Eastwood, 
supra note 84. 
 344. See Eastwood, supra note 84. 
 345. Snow, 70 C.P.R. (2d) 105; see Eastwood, supra note 84. 
 346. See Eastwood, supra note 84. 
 347. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(2) (2012). 
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time.348 
Based on the court’s decision in MASS MoCA349 and the House Report’s 
statement on the facts in Snow,350 it seems that the temporary distortion, mod-
ification, or mutilation of art—such as partially covering it with a tarp or tying 
red ribbons on it—would not violate the right to integrity under VARA.351  
However, VARA does not use the words permanent or temporary or draw a 
line between those differences in the statute.352  Indeed, it is interesting to 
consider why the temporary or impermanent distortion of a piece of work 
would be excused from VARA even though it may cause permanent damage 
to an artist’s honor and reputation.  For instance, would the same exact activ-
ities—placing a tarp over the work or tying ribbons on art pieces—violate 
VARA had they been semi-permanent?  What if MASS MoCA decided to 
exhibit Büchel’s work covered with a tarp for many years or as a permanent 
exhibition?  What if the mall in Eaton Centre decided to never take the red 
ribbons off of Snow’s geese sculptures?  VARA does not use the words per-
manent or temporary in the statute, and it seems arbitrary for a violation of the 
right of integrity to rest upon whether the mutilation was permanent or imper-
manent.  Indeed, how long must a mutilation occur for it to be permanent and, 
therefore, actionable?  What types of distortions are, in fact, permanent?  Is 
Agata Oleksiak’s yarn bombing of Charging Bull in a pink and purple cozy 
knit permanent?353  Could an artist not succeed under a VARA claim against 
a third party who sprays paint on a concrete sculpture because there are now 
chemicals that can effectively remove spray paint from concrete?  Instead of 
drawing an arbitrary line between permanent and impermanent mutilation of 
works, perhaps these activities could be appropriately examined under fair 
use. 
For instance, in MASS MoCA v. Büchel, the Museum’s covering and ex-
hibiting of Büchel’s unfinished sculpture in a Made at MASS MoCA exhibit 
could be considered fair use.354  As a preliminary matter, covering the work 
 
 348. H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6921 (footnotes omitted). 
 349. See supra text accompanying notes 333–42. 
 350. H.R. REP. NO. 101-514. 
 351. See discussion supra notes 332–50; 17 U.S.C. § 106A. 
 352. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 106A. 
 353. See Malia Wollan, Graffiti’s Cozy, Feminine Side, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2011), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/19/fashion/creating-graffiti-with-yarn.html. 
 354. See Mass. Museum of Contemporary Art Found., Inc. v. Büchel, 593 F.3d 38, 45–46 (1st Cir. 
2010). 
[Vol. 47: 601, 2020] Creative Destruction 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
649 
and exhibiting it in an exhibition focusing on the Museum’s successful and 
failed collaboration with artists seems to transform the meaning of the work 
to create a new message.355  According to the Museum’s website: 
 Made at MASS MoCA [was] a documentary project exploring the 
issues raised in the course of complex collaborative projects between 
artists and institutions.  The exhibition examines some of the many 
ways in which MASS MoCA has worked with a wide range of visual 
and performing artists over more than a decade.  In addition to serv-
ing as a presenter—the conventional role of museums—MASS 
MoCA is also a fabricator of large-scale works, a host of extended 
artist residencies, and a collaborator and co-producer.  The exhibition 
looks at the implications of those roles and relationships and how 
they are relevant to the making and distribution of art today.   
 Made at MASS MoCA gives visitors insight into how major works 
of art take shape and what it means to describe MASS MoCA as an 
open platform for research and development in the arts.356 
The court in MASS MoCA acknowledged: 
MASS MoCA was not necessarily acting with pure intentions when 
it created “Made at MASS MoCA” in close proximity to the tarped 
“Training Ground.”  It might be a fair inference that the Museum was 
deliberately communicating its anger with Büchel by juxtaposing his 
unfinished work with the successful artistic collaborations depicted 
in its new exhibition.357   
Assume that the MASS MoCA exhibit was intended to exhibit both successful 
and failed collaborations with artists by partially covering Büchel’s work with 
a tarp and juxtaposing his unfinished work with the MASS MoCA’s other 
successful collaborations;358 MASS MoCA has certainly transformed 
 
 355. Id. 
 356. Made at MASS MoCA, MASS MOCA, https://massmoca.org/event/made-mass-moca/ (last vis-
ited Mar. 4, 2019). 
 357. Büchel, 593 F.3d at 61–62. 
 358. See id. at 62. 
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Büchel’s work to express a new purpose, message, and meaning.  As a non-
profit museum359 whose mission is to educate the public,360 the Museum’s use 
of Büchel’s work would further be considered to be of a noncommercial na-
ture.361  Under the second factor of fair use, while Büchel’s work is highly 
expressive and creative, we know that this does not necessarily tilt the fair use 
analysis where the follow-on creator uses the work in a transformative manner 
to comment on the social and aesthetic meaning of the work.362 
The third factor of fair use, the amount and substantiality of the portion 
used, might also weigh in favor of fair use.363  While Büchel’s entire work was 
partially covered under the tarp during the exhibition, portions of his work 
were actually viewable, creating “a conceptual peep show.”364  Furthermore, 
where the follow-on creator uses the original work in order to comment upon 
the work, courts recognize that the follow-on creator needs to use enough of 
the original in order to get their message across.365  Finally, the fourth factor, 
market harm, is debatable.366  Exhibiting Büchel’s work covered under a tarp 
might cause harm to the future market of Büchel’s works, either due to the 
disparaging commentary about Büchel’s behavior or due to viewers gaining 
“an inaccurate sense of his art” and judging “his work on the basis of this 
experience.”367  The former harm resulting from disparaging commentary 
about Büchel’s behavior is not harm that is nor should be considered under 
fair use.368  Indeed, museums should be able to use an artist’s work to criticize 
the artist’s behavior just as they can use words to criticize the artist; if this 
causes museums to be wary of partnering with Büchel in the future, that harm 
 
 359. FAQs, MASS MOCA, https://massmoca.org/visit/faq-frequently-asked-questions/ (last visited 
Oct. 8, 2019). 
 360. Education, MASS MOCA, https://massmoca.org/education/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2019). 
 361. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2012). 
 362. See supra notes 316–19 and accompanying text. 
 363. Measuring Fair Use: The Four Factors, STAN. UNIV. LIBRARIES, https://fairuse.stan-
ford.edu/overview/fair-use/four-factors/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2019) (“The less you take, the more likely 
that your copying will be excused as fair use.”). 
 364. Mass. Museum of Contemporary Art Found., Inc. v. Büchel, 593 F.3d 38, 61 (1st Cir. 2010). 
 365. See Chi. Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 2003) (“The general 
standard . . . is clear enough: the fair use copier must copy no more than is reasonably necessary [not 
strictly necessary—room must be allowed for judgment, and judges must not police criticism with a 
heavy hand] to enable him to pursue an aim that the law recognizes as proper . . . .”). 
 366. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4). 
 367. Büchel, 593 F.3d at 60. 
 368. See id. at 62. 
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to Büchel is not the type of market harm that fair use considers.369  On the 
other hand, even though this fourth fair use factor is most concerned with the 
potential market for, or value of, the work used (here, Büchel’s Training 
Ground), the harm to Büchel’s future market due to viewers gaining an inac-
curate sense of this art is potentially the type of market harm that fair use 
should consider when dealing with a right of integrity claim. 370  Weighing the 
four factors of the fair use inquiry seems to support a finding of fair use in this 
case. 
Putting aside whether the beribboned geese actually harmed the artist’s 
honor and reputation, it is harder to find fair use in the facts of Snow v. Eaton 
Centre.371  As a preliminary matter, what artistic, social, political, or expres-
sive message is the shopping center trying to send by tying red ribbons around 
Snow’s geese sculptures?372  In mid-1982, the marketing director for Eaton 
Centre, a shopping mall, began planning its decoration in anticipation of the 
Christmas shopping season.373  Part of the decoration involved tying large red 
ribbons on the necks of the sixty geese sculptures and creating an advertising 
campaign, including posters, shopping bags, banners, centered on the ber-
ibboned geese.374  Instead of using Snow’s sculptures to express an artistic 
message, the Eaton Centre’s purpose for using Snow’s sculptures was com-
mercial—to promote the shopping center and the holiday shopping season.375  
The Eaton Centre did not transform the meaning of Snow’s sculptures to send 
an artistic, political, or social message, and its commercial purpose likely 
 
 369. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994) (“[b]iting criticism [that 
merely] suppresses demand” is not a cognizable harm under the Copyright Act (alterations in original) 
(quoting Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 431, 438 (9th Cir. 1986))); Henley v. DeVore, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 
1154 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (“In many cases, the most effective tool of ridiculing a public figure . . . is 
through that person’s own creations.  This is particularly true where a person’s fame derives from that 
person’s expressive works, as the case often is with artists, musicians, authors, and the like.  The First 
Amendment demands that these public figures be open to ridicule, just as their works should be.”). 
 370.  See Robert C. Bird, Moral Rights: Diagnosis and Rehabilitation, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 407, 432 
(2009) (“[A]rt is uniquely vulnerable to financial diminution through denigration or mutilation, be-
cause each art piece is a powerful advertisement for all the artist’s works.  Similarly, unauthorized 
modification of a work can impair the artist’s stature, diluting the perceived esteem of her entire body 
of creative output.”). 
 371. See Snow v. The Eaton Centre Ltd. (1982) 70 C.P.R. (2d) 105 (Can. Ont. H.C.J.). 
 372. See generally supra note 84. 
 373. See generally Eastwood, supra note 84. 
 374. Id. 
 375. Id. 
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weighs against fair use under the first fair use factor.376  The second377 and 
third378 factors of § 107 also weigh against a finding of fair use due to the 
Eaton Centre’s use of all of Snow’s sixty geese sculptures and the highly ex-
pressive nature of Snow’s work.379  Based on the facts of this case, the last 
factor is equipoised.380  While certain art experts testified that the red ribbons 
made “a mockery of [the work’s] intended purpose by distorting its appear-
ance, transforming it into a ‘kitschy’ sentimental display, resembling a Christ-
mas bauble,” another expert testified that the red ribbons around the geese 
presented a “‘joyful Christmas statement,’ and that his favourable opinion of 
Snow was not in any way affected on seeing the work.”381  Balancing the fac-
tors in this case would likely find that the Eaton Centre’s distortion and dis-
play of Snow’s sculptural work was not fair. 
While current interpretations of the right of integrity seem to exclude 
from its reach temporary or impermanent mutilations of works, this exclusion 
has the potential to be arbitrary, especially where there is a thin line between 
temporary versus permanent mutilations of works, and where the imperma-
nent mutilation of an author’s work can cause the same prejudice to an au-
thor’s honor and reputation as the permanent mutilation of the author’s work.  
Furthermore, under an expanded moral rights legislation, where moral rights 
might apply to works other than single or limited-edition works of visual art, 
the line between permanent mutilation and impermanent mutilation would no 
longer hold.382  Instead of drawing an artificial line between permanent versus 
impermanent mutilations, perhaps some of these circumstances may be better 
examined under the doctrine of fair use, excusing a follow-on creator where 
the follow-on work uses the author’s work to express a new artistic, social, or 
 
 376. Id.; see Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985) (“The fact 
that a publication was commercial as opposed to nonprofit is a separate factor that tends to weigh 
against a finding of fair use.  ‘[E]very commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively an 
unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright.’” (alteration 
in original) (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984))). 
 377. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2012) (stating the second factor as “the nature of the copyrighted work”). 
 378. Id. § 107(3) (stating the third factor as “the amount and substantiality of the portion used in 
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole”). 
 379. See Eastwood, supra note 84. 
 380. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (stating the fourth factor as “the effect of the use upon the potential market 
for or value of the copyrighted work”). 
 381. See Eastwood, supra note 84. 
 382. See supra Section II.B.  For instance, how does one distinguish between a “permanent” versus 
an “impermanent” mutilation of a song?  Or a text?  Or a movie? 
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political message. 
C. Permanent Mutilation of Original or Limited-Edition Works 
The most difficult case to make for fair use is in the context of a follow-
on creator who permanently distorts, mutilates, or modifies an original or lim-
ited-edition copy of an artist’s work in order to make an artistic, social, or 
political statement.  For the reasons discussed in Section II.A, it is difficult to 
imagine a situation where the destruction of an original work, or a limited-
edition work, could be excused under fair use.  However, there are important 
social and political messages that can only be expressed through the mutila-
tion of an original or limited-edition work.383  In fact, as Amy Adler explained, 
“there is an artistic value in modifying, defacing[,] and even destroying unique 
works of art.”384 
An example of mutilating an original work in order to send a political or 
social message is the “creative destruction” of colonialist or racist monu-
ments.385  Instead of removing racist monuments in New Orleans, which may 
signal a repudiation of America’s racist past but may also effectively erase 
America’s racist history, Adler advocates for the creative destruction of racist 
monuments, in other words “to ‘create’ a new work by vandalizing the mon-
ument.”386  An example of creative destruction occurred when vandals de-
faced a racist Civil War-era sculpture in New Orleans with anti-racist graf-
fiti.387  The same concept of creative destruction can also apply to 
contemporary works.  A recent example involved conceptual artist Sam Du-
rant who created a sculpture, Scaffold, which was erected in the Walker Art 
Center’s sculpture garden in Minneapolis in 2016.388  Scaffold was an un-
painted wood-and-metal sculpture, more than fifty-feet tall, that included 
 
 383. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 27, at 287 (“The interest in destruction is so pervasive in contempo-
rary art that, in 2002, French critic Bruno Latour declared: ‘Art has become a synonym for the de-
struction of art.’  In fact, . . . the defining feature of contemporary art has been its at-tack on the co-
herence of ‘art’ as a category.  In this light, physical attacks against art objects can be understood as 
particularly valuable forms of expression.  Moral rights law therefore rests on a vision of art at odds 
with contemporary art practice.  The law obstructs rather than enables the creation of art.”). 
 384. Id. at 279. 
 385. See id. at 280. 
 386. Id. 
 387. Id. 
 388. Sheila Dickinson, ‘A Seed of Healing and Change’: Native Americans Respond to Sam Du-
rant’s ‘Scaffold’, ARTNEWS (June 5, 2017), http://www.artnews.com/2017/06/05/a-seed-of-healing-
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stairways allowing visitors to climb to reach a platform.389  The purpose of 
Scaffold was to bring awareness to the dark history of Minnesota, where the 
largest mass execution occurred in U.S. history when thirty-eight Dakota 
Sioux men were hanged in 1862.390  While Durant’s intention was to bring 
awareness to “the racial dimension of the criminal justice system in the United 
States,”391 Scaffold deeply offended the local Native American communities 
“because of the unique context and history of trauma that the surrounding land 
inscribed on it and the form of the scaffold.”392  This portrayal of genocide by 
a non-Native American artist prompted overwhelming outcry and backlash, 
“fueled not only by anger about cultural appropriation of murder but also by 
another unfortunate resonance: the current suicide rate among Native Ameri-
can teenagers is the highest of any population in the United States.”393  Durant, 
the Walker Art Center, and Dakota Tribal leaders considered various out-
comes for Scaffold, which included dismantling it, burning it, or burying it.394  
As a commentator acknowledged, “Disposing of artworks and burning them 
is a pretty strong statement.”395  Regardless of opinions criticizing the destruc-
tion of Scaffold as censorship, or applauding the destruction as culturally sen-
sitive, it is indisputable that the controversy and dialogue surrounding the de-
struction of Durant’s sculpture led to more awareness and education about the 
United States’ past injustices and racial genocide than did Durant’s sculpture 
itself.396  Ultimately, Durant acknowledged that “the ways in which this pro-
cess unfolded allowed me to transform Scaffold with the help of the Dakota 
 
and-change-native-americans-respond-to-sam-durants-scaffold/. 
 389. Andrea K. Scott, Does An Offensive Sculpture Deserve to be Burned?, NEW YORKER (June 3, 
2017), https://www.newyorker.com/culture/cultural-comment/does-an-offensive-sculpture-deserve-
to-be-burned. 
 390. Id. 
 391. Sam Durant, A Statement From Sam Durant (5.29.17), WALKER NEWS (May 29, 2017), 
https://walkerart.org/magazine/a-statement-from-sam-durant-05-29-17. 
 392. Olga Viso, Why Taking Down Sam Durant’s Scaffold Was the Right Thing to Do, ART 
NEWSPAPER (Aug. 30, 2017), https://www.theartnewspaper.com/comment/why-taking-down-sam-
durants-scaffold-was-the-right-thing-to-do. 
 393. Scott, supra note 389; see also Hilarie M. Sheets, Dakota People Are Debating Whether to 
Burn ‘Scaffold’ Fragments, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/05/arts/de-
sign/dakota-people-are-debating-whether-to-burn-scaffold-fragments.html?_r=0&module=inline 
(“Native American groups denounced the insensitivity of the piece in recalling what they regarded as 
an act of genocide . . . .”). 
 394. Sheets, supra note 393. 
 395. Id. 
 396. See Dickinson, supra note 388. 
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(and the media) into something that will have a far greater impact in society 
and be closer to my original intentions than if the work had remained as it was 
constructed in the sculpture garden.”397  The parties came to an agreement to 
dismantle Scaffold and to bury the dismantled wood in a secret location in 
Minnesota.398 
In addition to sending a political or social message through the mutilation 
of works, artists have also used the mutilation of works to send artistic mes-
sages or have created new meaning with their mutilation and follow-on crea-
tions.  For instance, in 2003, artists Jake and Dinos Chapman shocked the 
world when they purchased and destroyed a rare and revered series of limited-
edition prints by Francisco Goya.399  The prints were Goya’s Disasters of War, 
consisting of eighty etchings printed from the artist’s plates.400  The Disasters 
of War etchings were inspired by Napoleon’s invasion of Spain and were 
“hailed as the ultimate antiwar statement in art.”401  They were so significant 
that they inspired Pablo Picasso to create his antiwar painting, Guernica.402  
The Chapman brothers systematically went through all eighty of the first-rate, 
mint-condition etchings and superimposed colorful clown heads and puppies 
on all of the heads of the agonized victims of war.403  The Chapmans titled 
their new collection Insult to Injury, whose message was to “proclaim the in-
adequacy of art as protest.”404  Jonathan Jones, an art critic for The Guardian, 
described them as “brilliant and profound . . . [s]omehow, they do not destroy, 
but find something new in the Disasters of War[;] . . . [t]hey are given life, 
personality, by some very acute drawing, and so it’s not a collision but a col-
laboration, an assimilation, as they really do seem to belong in the pictures.”405 
The Chapmans brothers’ series, One Day You Will No Longer Be Loved, 
 
 397. Viso, supra note 392. 
 398. Sheila M. Eldred, Dakota Plan to Bury, Not Burn, ‘Scaffold’ Sculpture, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/01/arts/design/dakota-plan-to-bury-not-burn-scaffold-
sculpture.html. 
 399. Jonathan Jones, Look What We Did, GUARDIAN (Mar. 31, 2003), https://www.theguard-
ian.com/culture/2003/mar/31/artsfeatures.turnerprize2003. 
 400. Id. 
 401. Alan Riding, Goya Probably Would Not Be Amused, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2003), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2003/04/06/weekinreview/goya-probably-would-not-be-amused.html. 
 402. Id. 
 403. Jones, supra note 399. 
 404. Riding, supra note 401. 
 405. Jones, supra note 399. 
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was less shocking but equally destructive.406  For this collection, the Chap-
mans purchased nineteenth century portraits “by unknown artists of unknown 
subjects” and altered them.407  The purpose of their follow-on work was to 
“highlight[] society’s attitude to the past as irrelevant and not worth remem-
bering.  The work is disturbing both because of the sitters decaying face and 
because an apparent old master has been defaced.  The work reflects the broth-
ers continuing concern with the human preoccupation with mortality . . . .”408 
An earlier, but equally shocking, act of creative destruction was Robert 
Rauschenberg’s Erased de Kooning Drawing.409  In 1953, Rauschenberg took 
a drawing by Willem de Kooning and slowly erased it.410  It took Rauschen-
berg two months to erase it,411 resulting in a “sheet of paper bearing the faint, 
ghostly shadow of its former markings.”412  He then labeled it, matted it, and 
framed the work, inscribing below the now-obliterated de Kooning drawing: 
Erased de Kooning Drawing, Robert Rauschenberg, 1953.413  The result was 
a new piece of work whose fame eventually surpassed many of de Kooning’s 
own works.414  To Rauschenberg, it was important that the erased work was 
an original work by a significant artist, because the work “depend[ed] on the 
fact that he violated not a reproduction of work but an original, and not just 
any original, but an original by Willem de Kooning.”415  This was the only 
way Rauschenberg could express his message by performing a literal act of 
iconoclasm, by expanding what art could be.416  Erasing the best work of the 
past expressed the message “that new art might be about its own failure to 
achieve greatness, its impotent rebellion against the heroic past[,] . . . art 
that . . . [is] about ‘its own destruction.’”417 
 
 406. One Day You Will No Longer Be Loved (That It Should Come to This) III, ART FUND, 
https://www.artfund.org/supporting-museums/art-weve-helped-buy/artwork/11735/one-day-you-
will-no-longer-be-loved-that-it-should-come-to-this-iii (last visited Mar. 3, 2019). 
 407. Id. 
 408. Id. 
 409. Adler, supra note 27, at 283. 
 410. Id. 
 411. Cain, supra note 261. 
 412. Adler, supra note 27, at 283. 
 413. Robert Rauschenberg, Erased de Kooning Drawing, 1953, supra note 258.  
 414. Greg Allen, Erased De Kooning Drawing is Bigger Than It Used to Be, GREG.ORG (Jan. 11, 
2012), https://greg.org/archive/2012/01/11/erased-de-kooning-drawing-is-bigger-than-it-used-to-
be.html. 
 415. Adler, supra note 27, at 283. 
 416. Id. 
 417. Id. 
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These examples support follow-on creators who create new meaning and 
artistic expression through the use of another’s work, where that new meaning 
can only be expressed through the use of an original or limited-edition work.  
Under a fair use analysis, these follow-on creators transformed the originals 
by giving them new meaning and by expressing a new message through their 
transformations.  The original works—sculptures and paintings—were ex-
pressive and creative, but the nature of the original works is less important 
where the follow-on creator transforms the original work to express a new 
meaning or purpose.  Similarly, even though the follow-on creators in all of 
the examples above used the entireties of the authors’ original works, that use 
was necessary to express their artistic, social, or political messages.418  The 
final factor of fair use is a more difficult analysis.419  The permanent mutila-
tion, modification, or distortion of the author’s original work certainly seems 
like it would harm the market for the author’s work because the original work 
no longer exists, but that does not seem to be a consideration for the fair use 
doctrine420 or the moral right of integrity.421  As a preliminary matter, by the 
time the work is distorted by the follow-on creator, the physical work usually 
no longer belongs to the author, so the author has no market rights to their 
original work of art.422  The author retains their right to create reproductions 
of their original work, and the distortion of the original work might in fact 
increase rather than decrease the market value of the author’s reproductions 
because the original is no longer available.423  Similarly, the transformative 
works described in this context are not generally attributed to the original au-
thor.  Transformed works are, instead, clearly attributed to the follow-on cre-
ator.424  For instance, the Chapman brothers renamed their transformed works 
 
 418. See Yonover, supra note 26, at 118 (“[P]arody of a visual art . . . may necessitate a more total 
appropriation than a parody of . . . a song or a play.”). 
 419. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2012) (“[T]he effect of the use upon the potential market for or value 
of the copyrighted work . . . .”). 
 420. See generally id. § 107. 
 421. See generally id. § 106A(a)(3)(A) (2012). 
 422. See, e.g., Cain, supra note 261 (discussing how Willem de Kooning gave Rauschenberg a 
drawing, which Rauschenberg then erased and entitled Erased de Kooning); Jones, supra note 399 
(explaining that the Chapmans purchased a rare limited-edition series of Goya’s Disasters of War and 
subsequently painted onto it). 
 423. See Adler, supra note 27, at 284 (“Destroying art can be a valuable way of making art. . . .  De-
struction is not simply an occasionally valuable thing, but rather, a central quality of ‘art’ itself.”). 
 424. See supra notes 399–417 and accompanying text. 
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and attributed those works to themselves,425 and Rauschenberg inscribed his 
own name below Erased de Kooning.426  This means that viewers of the fol-
low-on creators’ works will not gain an inaccurate sense of the original au-
thor’s work or judge the author’s work on the basis of the transformative 
uses.427 
Some may argue that, if we were to apply fair use in right of integrity 
cases, then what is to stop anyone who destroys or mutilates a work from 
claiming that their mutilation, modification, or distortion was fair use?  For 
instance, what would prevent the developer in Cohen v. G & M Realty L.P. 
from claiming that his intent in white-washing the street art on the 5Pointz 
warehouse was to give the street art new purpose, message, or meaning?428  
Courts have faced similar questions numerous times in the past in infringe-
ment and fair use disputes, and have made case-by-case determinations on 
when follow-on creators actually transform copyrighted works to give them 
new meanings and messages, and when they do not.429  There is no reason that 
courts would have difficulty making the same determinations for integrity 
claims as they have in countless infringement claims in the past.430  Further-
more, courts do not rely solely on a follow-on creator’s intent to transform; 
they examine the follow-on work to determine whether the work expresses a 
meaningfully-different message or purpose than the original.  An example of 
this is the case of Rogers v. Koons.431  Koons testified that his use of Roger’s 
photograph of a couple holding a string of puppies was intended as 
social criticism . . . to support that proposition that . . . the mass pro-
duction of commodities and media images has caused a deterioration 
in the quality of society, and this artistic tradition of which he is a 
member proposes through incorporating these images into works of 
art to comment critically both on the incorporated object and the po-
litical and economic system that created it.432 
 
 425. Jones, supra note 399. 
 426. Robert Rauschenberg, Erased de Kooning Drawing, 1953, supra note 258. 
 427. See Adler, supra note 27, at 282 (describing one critic’s focus on the Chapman brothers’ “act 
of shocking deviance”). 
 428. 320 F. Supp. 3d 421, 434–35 (E.D.N.Y. 2018). 
 429. See discussion supra Section III.A. 
 430.  See discussion supra Section III.A. 
 431. 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 432. Id. at 309. 
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The court nevertheless found that Koons’s expression in his sculptural work, 
String of Puppies, did not transform the meaning, message, or purpose of Rog-
ers’ original photo and was not fair use.433 
Take, as another example, one of the first moral right of integrity cases 
mentioned in this Paper—the case in Germany where a homeowner, uncom-
fortable with the nudes in a mural on his wall, hired an artist to paint clothing 
on the nudes.434  Painting clothing on nudes is not likely to be considered 
transformative for fair use for the same reason the sanitized version of a film 
was not considered transformative for fair use in Clean Flicks of Colorado, 
LLCs v. Soderbergh.435  Specifically,  
Bleeping certain words in the film’s dialogue or using a black bar or 
blurring to obscure some nudity in certain frames might . . . not really 
add any new purpose, character, expression, meaning[,] or message 
to the film, or might only add the message . . . that the movie contains 
some content that some people find objectionable.436 
Similarly, an owner’s attempt to sell a separated panel from Bernard Buffet’s 
compilation work on the refrigerator,437 and the Chicago Park District’s down-
sizing of Chapman Kelley’s Wildflower Works, 438 are also not likely to be 
considered transformative uses for fair use.  In the Bernard Buffet case, the 
separation and attempt by the owner of the work to sell the refrigerator panels 
piece-by-piece was clearly motivated by profit.  There was no artistic, social, 
or political message to send by selling a section of a work, and the separated 
panel did not serve a new purpose or send a new meaning or message by being 
separated from the rest.  Indeed, this act is similar to cutting up and selling 
pieces of a Picasso painting, which VARA’s legislative history indicates 
 
 433. Id. at 312. 
 434. See Merryman, supra note 18, at 1027 n.56 (discussing Reichsgericht [RG] [court of last resort 
for civil and criminal matters] June 8, 1912, 79 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES REICHSGERICHTS IN 
ZIVILSACHEN [RGZ] 397 (Ger.)). 
 435. 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1240–43 (D. Colo. 2006). 
 436. Reese, supra note 210, at 470 (discussing Clean Flicks, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1238); see also 
Disney Enterprises, Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 861 (9th Cir. 2017) (“VidAngel’s service 
does not add anything to Plaintiff’s works. It simply omits portions that viewers find objectionable, 
and transmits them for the same intrinsic entertainment value as the originals. . . . Although removing 
objectionable content may permit a viewer to enjoy a film, this does not necessarily add something 
new or change the expression, meaning, or message of the film.” (internal quotations omitted)).  
 437. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 438. See Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 294 (7th Cir. 2011). 
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would clearly violate an author’s right of integrity, 439 and it would create no 
new message or meaning.  Similarly, Chicago Park District’s downsizing of 
Kelley’s Wildflower Works was motivated purely by the need to redevelop 
Grant Park to make space for the new Millennium Park.440  The smaller-sized 
garden did not send a new message, meaning, or purpose. 
Even the case of Deckmyn v. Vandersteen, where the follow-on creator 
modified and distorted the cover of a famous comic to send a critical political 
message, may not be considered transformative for the purpose of fair use.441  
Courts are generally more inclined to find transformative use and, therefore, 
fair use where the follow-on work is a parody of the original rather than a 
satire that “merely uses [the original work] to get attention or to avoid the 
drudgery in working up something fresh.”442  Indeed, the Deckmyn case seems 
analogous to the facts in Dr. Seuss Enterprises v. Penguin Books.  In Dr. Seuss 
Enterprises, a follow-on creator used the look, feel, and characters from The 
Cat In the Hat to create The Cat Not In The Hat!, a “rhyming summary of 
highlights from the O.J. Simpson double murder trial.”443  In that case, the 
court found the follow-on creator’s work to be satire instead of parody and 
was therefore not transformative for the purpose of fair use.444 
Some may argue that recognizing fair use to moral right of integrity 
claims invites the destruction of great works of art.445  Take, for instance, the  
opening scenario in Joseph Sax’s Playing Darts with a Rembrandt, where 
“[a]n eccentric American collector who, for a Saturday evening’s amusement, 
invited his friends to play darts using his Rembrandt portrait as the target.”446  
Recognizing a fair use limitation to the right of integrity is not likely to en-
courage this type of behavior.  As a preliminary matter, VARA only protects 
moral rights of authors who are currently living.447  This would mean that great 
works of art by deceased masters would not be protected under VARA in the 
 
 439. See supra note 348 and accompanying text. 
 440. Kelley, 635 F.3d at 294. 
 441. See supra text accompanying notes 79–83. 
 442. Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1400 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 443. Id. at 1396. 
 444. Id. at 1400–01. 
 445. See discussion supra Section II.B. 
 446. SAX, supra note 58, at 1. 
 447. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d)(1) (2012). 
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first place.448  Second, the destruction of another’s property is still a crime.449  
Just because liability under moral rights may be limited by fair use does not 
mean it is protected from criminal or civil liability for destruction of property.  
For instance, in 1986, self-proclaimed artist Gerard Jan van Bladeren took a 
box cutter and slashed Barnett Newman’s American Abstract Expressionist 
masterpiece, Who’s Afraid of Red, Yellow and Blue III, hanging in the 
Stedelijk Museum in Amsterdam.450  Bladeren claimed that Newman’s paint-
ing was “a kind of cultural provocation” that “called for a reaction and got 
one.”451  In spite of his claimed artistic gesture, Bladeren served five months 
in jail and three months on parole for his destruction.452  Similarly, in 2014, 
Miami artist Maximo Caminero picked up one of artist Ai Weiwei’s Chinese 
urns at the Perez Art Museum Miami and smashed it.453  Caminero claimed 
that he smashed the vase as a “spontaneous protest.”454  Specifically, he saw 
Ai Weiwei’s photos behind the vases featuring Weiwei dropping and destroy-
ing an ancient Chinese vase “as a provocation by Weiwei to join him in an act 
of performance protest.”455  Putting aside the analysis of whether this act of 
destruction would be considered fair use, Caminero’s act was certainly a crime 
(and civil tort) for which he was arrested.456  Finally, fair use is not likely to 
encourage owners of original or limited-edition works to destroy their own 
valuable properties or works of art.  Owners of valuable works would be de-
terred from mutilating, distorting, or modifying their own property by the eco-
nomic consequences of those actions.  Unless they feel strongly the need to 
send a new and important artistic, political, or social message through the mu-
tilation of their valuable property, most owners of valuable works tend to want 
to preserve their works and the economic values in their works rather than 
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 449. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 594(a) (West 2019). 
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The moral right of integrity protects an author’s right to prevent any dis-
tortion, modification, or mutilation of their work that prejudices their honor 
and reputation.458  At the same time, fair use allows follow-on creators to 
transform the meaning or message of an author’s work to express a new mean-
ing or message, and “the public has moral entitlements to reuse and al-
ter . . . cultural artifacts made by others.”459  Even though the text of VARA 
explicitly includes language subjecting the moral right of integrity to copy-
right’s fair use limitation, there have been no cases in the United States apply-
ing § 107’s fair use factors to balance an author’s interest with the public’s 
moral entitlement.460  The lack of case law interpreting how courts might bal-
ance an author’s moral right of integrity with follow-on creators’ and the pub-
lic’s rights to expression is particularly troubling in light of the ongoing dis-
cussion to expand moral rights in the United States.  If moral rights are to be 
expanded, most interest groups, industry groups, and commentators agree that 
those rights must be subject to fair use.461  However, without any guidance 
from courts, and with commentators and legislative history doubting the com-
patibility of fair use with the right of integrity, how can the United States ex-
pand moral rights with the assumption that fair use would provide the balance 
between authors’ rights and the public’s rights?  This Paper examines past 
integrity cases to envision how fair use could be interpreted and applied to 
these various cases and contexts.462  Courts need not restrict the scope of fair 
use to give the moral right of integrity meaning.  It is clear from the analysis 
in this Paper that copyright’s fair use doctrine is flexible enough to serve as a 
limitation on an author’s moral right of integrity, and the four fair use factors 
may be used to balance the author’s rights with the public’s rights to find fair 
use where a follow-on creator modifies, distorts, or mutilates an author’s work 
 
 457. But cf. Edward J. Damich, supra note 15, at 9 (discussing a French case where an artist “slashed 
and th[rew] away some of his paintings,” then someone found and restored the paintings and put them 
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to transform the work and give the work new meaning or to express a political, 
social, or artistic message. 
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